# KOSOVA



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## KOSOVA

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5

## ALBANIANS' NATIONAL UNION ISSUE IN THE SEPTEMBER 1913 UPRISING

hough Albania was developing under new conditions and moreover the Albanian independent state was already established, whole territories of the country remained under the Serb-Montenegrin and Greek yoke. The September 1913 uprising embodied a liberation and national character. It served to the union of all Albanian lands under an unified national state.

The most current history of Albanian nation has incontestably proved that the Albanian independent state could not be established without the astonishing contribution that the Albanian population of Kosova, Dibra, Fusha e Pollogut, Skopje and other regions, gave during the National Movement of Renaissance period. The memorandums and protests of the Vlorë Provisional Government to the Ambassadors' Conference, opened in London in 1913, considered as the biggest injustice made to Albanian nation, the stripping from the independent state, of those territories and of a population, which more than else had fought and shed blood for an unified national state.

Though under the difficult conditions of the Balkan War and the Serb-Montenegrin aggression, the Albanian regions of Kosova and present Macedonia, which would be turned into the cradle of the 1913 Uprising, sent their own representatives at the Vlorë National Assembly,

giving to the latter the attributes of a nationwide Assembly. On the day the Vlorë Assembly elected the Provisional Government, on December 4, 1912, 11 out the 54 participant delegates in the meeting, were from Kosova, Dibra, Tetova, Ochrid and other regions1. Apart from Isa Boletini, who despite being offered no post in the government, was one of the closest collaborators of Ismail Qemal, three other personalities from Kosova and other occupied regions were elected in the Vlorë Provisional Government. They were Vehbi Dibra (Agolli), Head of the Council of Dignitaries, Mehmet Pashë Dëralla, Minister of Defence and Hasan Prishtina, who later became Minister of Agriculture.

The Albanian Independent state, proclaimed on November 28, 1912 by the Vlorë Assembly, would incorporate within its borders, following the concept of the Renaissance representatives as well, all the Albanian regions, fulfilling this way the essential request for a national union. This historic mission was taken on by I. Qemal, who along with other patriots, decided to proclaim the independence and found the Albanian state.

The Renaissance patriots and the Albanian people regarded the Vlorë Government as a nation-wide organization and a government of a single state and nation, around which, as the Albanian press of that time stated, "all the Albanian people would gather under the Albanian flag". To the Renaissance representatives, this government represented the national ideal, the aspiration for independence, which was inseparable from the one concerning the founding of an unified national state.

All the actions, put into practice by the government of Ismail Qemal, embodied the idea that the Albanian independent state and its Provisional Government represented all the population and the Albanian regions, though they were under the Serb-Montegrin and Greek bondage. On November 29, 1912, I. Qemal declared to the six great powers, the Balkan states and their military commands in Albania that the Proclamation of Independence and the establishment of the Provisional Government were ascribed to the National Assembly, which was attended by delegates of all Albanian regions. He also asked them "to recognize this change in the political life of Albanian nation", "protect the national existence of Albanians" and "give back to Albania the unfairly annexed and occupied lands"3.

But, the Balkans and the Great powers hampered the Albanian people from achieving this legitimate aspiration. The Ambassadors' Conference (1912-1913) of the six Great powers recognized the Albanian state, in the western part of the Balkan peninsula, as a territory with its borders, seriously abused. More than half of the Albanian territories and population, including Kosova, the Northern Albanian regions and Cameria in South, were annexed to Serbia, Montenegro and Greece.

The Vlore government opposed the decisions of London Conference because they ran contrary with the legitimate aspiration to the Albanians. In a declaration of April 3, 1913, the government highlighted: "the Albanians, as the most compact and homogeneous ethnic group on the Balkan peninsula, had the right to estab-

lish their unified national state because such decisions ignored the principle of nationality and substituted it with the right of war and of the invadors<sup>34</sup>.

Albania's partition caused a big trauma and shock to the Albanian people, who opposed this injustice. The Albanians protested because the most fertile lands of their own country were annexed to Serbia, Montenegro and Greece, and only the mountainous and rocky areas were ceded to them. Consequently, Albania's foundations for a normal development were violated.

"The establishment of Albanian state", according to the Vlorë government's memorandum, sent against the Great Powers on April 3, "was changed into an empty word". Protests in various Albanian districts to the Great Powers denounced "the annexation of Kosova, Northern and Eastern Albanian districts and Cameria, considering this as an unfair act since these regions, in the light of language and national customs, were undoubtedly part of Albania".

Developed under these circumstances, the September 1913 Revolt became part of the general movement for national unity, a very important component that had a tremendous effect on Albania's internal and external policy. The spark of this revolt was undoubtedly the policy of violence, extermination and displacement of Albanian population, which Serbia and Montenegro applied over the dismembered territories of Kosova and other northern-eastern regions of Albania. One of the publications of the time (1913) openly conceded that "the most barbarous persecutions, known by the world history shave been repeated" in Kosova and other regions, annexed by Serbia.

By judging synthetically this tragic situation, which the Albanian population was going through under the influence of political and economic factors, the Vlorë government's paper, "Përlindja e Shqypnies" (Albania's Rebirth), the Social-Democratic Party's paper and notably Dimitrije Tucovic, stressed during these days that "the Albanians rose in revolt because they were faced with the alternative" to die in war

or of starvation". The same idea was expressed even by the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Berchtold, who in his telegrams to the embassies of his own country in Europe, stressed that "the Albanian uprising has been broken out in the Serbs-invaded areas because of the Serb brutality" (8). Whereas the rebellious population of Dibra, in an appeal to the Great Powers on October 15, 1913, wrote that "after enduring for ten months in turn the Serb yoke, the last persecutions have driven us to such a despair that we prefer now death to slavery.." (9).

After admitting the direct influence of the political and economic factors on the September 1913 Rebellion, it should be stressed that the real causes of this Rebellion should be sought in the sources of such tragic consequences, which date to Albania's dismemberment, to this big historic injustice that was made to the country. This movement, which would emerge in various forms in the following years and during the present time as well, proved that the Albanians would never agree with the unfair decisions of the London Conference and that the national community and the aspiration to establish a national political, economic and cultural unit was an undeniable reality for the Albanian people.

The Uprising broke out in mid-September 1913 in Dibra. By the end of this month and early in October, it was spread across Ochrid, Struga, Tetova, Gostivar, Kërçovë, Malësia e Gjakovës, Prizren, Luma and other regions. The September 1913 uprising, judged by its welldefined objectives (liberation of Albanian regions from the Serb aggressors) and especially the objective goals it had planned to achieve as well as the perspective in resolving the national issue, represented the first massive operation, which the population of Albanian occupied areas organized to shake off the Serb and Montenegrin yoke and realize the reuniting of Albanian independent state. On October 15, 1913, the Dibra rebel forces, on behalf of the aspiration of all annexed regions' populations, asked from Europe to save them by "giving the right to live in freedom in their united(10) motherland". The idea of reuniting all the annexed lands with Albania, though not always openly and directly presented, has entirely permeated the correspondence between the Dibra Provisional Government and the rebel forces with the Elbasan Prefect, Agif Pashë Biçaku and the government of Ismail Qemal. In a letter, addressed on September 26 to the Vlora government's Head, Agif Pasha, after conveying the systematic requests of the rebel forces for weapons, says to Ismail Qemal: "Your Excellency, what do you think? Is it possible to get arms from any country in order that the marching of all these heroes would not go in vain and moreover we would not lose this valuable piece of our motherland? What's your opinion Sir?". These few words imply not only the rebels'supplying with weapons but the taking of this chance as Pasha says "to carry this issue through to the end in order to achieve the aim" of the revolt, i.e to change by force the decisions of London Conference on Albanians' borders and re-unite all annexed areas with Albania.

The September 1913 uprising, though like any other liberation movement, started with local actions, soon turned into an organized movement which came under the leadership of National Movement's notable leaders, such as Isa Boletini, Hasan Prishtina, Bajram Curri, Elez Isufi and others. They were some of Kosova's personalities, who represented the Albanian regions, conquered by Serbia and Montenegro, to the Vlora government, becoming consequently a symbol of the Albanians' national unity. They unanimously adhered to this political faction, whose main objective was to fight for the abolition of Serb and Montenegrin slavery not only from those regions, which according to the London Conference were part of Albania, but of other Albania- inhabited areas in order to reunite them with the independent Albania.

The liberation and national character of the September 1913 Uprising can not be put into doubt even by the declarations of Belgrade's government (released on September 1913), or

those of the Russian Deputy-Foreign Minister, Neratov, who considered the rebellion "an attack of Albanian gangs on Serb territory", or "a clash between terrorists on the Serb territory" or an incursion of "armed and blood-thirsty gangs on the Serb border" (12). Such a propaganda was opposed at that time by the Serb social-democratic paper "Radnicke Novine", in which Zekerie Cana, under the paper's chronicle "The Third War", stressed the national and liberation aspect of Albanian Sept.1913 Revolt and openly declared that "its aim was not to become wealthy but to realize the reuniting of all invaded areas with Albania" (13).

The relation of the leaders of September 1913 Uprising with the Vlora Provisional Government throw light on the character of this revolt. It was clear that the Albanian independent state, being military unprepared, isolated and paralysed by the interferences of foreign powers, could not be totally mobilised to help the 1913 Uprising. Its leaders, as it was expected, turned their eyes towards Vlora. This was understandable considering the revolt's final objective, i.e the reuniting of occupied areas with Albania, towards which Oemal's Government was totally interested. The correspondence of the revolt's leaders with Aqif Pashë Elbasani and the Vlorë Provisional Government, though mainly focused on rebel's provision with weapons, put forth other problems related to the solution of national issue. The insurgents hoped to assure the diplomatic support of Vlora government in their fight for national liberation. By the end of September 1913, the Dibra rebellion leaders sent a letter to Aqif Pashë Elbasani, where they stated that "we can proceed with the aid we are about to receive but not for long if such a situation continues. Similar problems, even between the normal governments, are settled by diplomatic means. So, enter into correspondence with Vlora, take at all haste the necessary measures and please be so kind to inform us about the conclusions...."(14). Whereas another letter, addressed to the Head of Vlorë government, I. Qemal, after describing all the successes of the rebel forces in Gjirokastra and

Prizren, says that "the people, more than ever, have turned their eyes on you Sir and are waiting for measures, which would liberate them from the Serbs, sorrounding them" (15).

Such requests did not just imply the necessity of the interference of the Vlorë Government to avoid eventual macabre acts that Serbia could realize as a counterbalance. These requests, presented on the last week of September, when the rebels were scoring successive successes, exceeded such limits: it was hoped that the Vlorë Provisional Government would intervene and ask the Great Powers to re-examine the decisions of London Conference on Albania's partition, and as Aqif Pashë Elbasani openly said to Ismail Qemal, make use of this revolt for asking, on behalf of the aspiration of rebellious areas' population, a reuniting of theirs with the Albanian state(16).

The rebels also vehemently asked, through the secret diplomatic meetings they had, say, with the representatives of Austria-Hungary, or various appeals, as the one the Dibra population made to the Great Powers, for the help of European countries, which by applying the principles of justice, could set them free from the Serb yoke and realize their reuniting with their mother country(17).

In all the cases, the insurgents' orientation was right: only a resolute combination of the three elements, the rebels, the Albanian state's commitment and the active interference, in favour of the Albanians, of the powerful European Cabinets, which carried the historical and moral responsibility for the tragic consequences that Albania's dismemberment brought about for the country, would lead to the correction of this injustice and the guaranteeing of a free and total progress of Albania.

The insurgents' requests were a strong temptation to the Vlorë Provisional Government. The latter and the Albanian population of the free areas, were as much interested in the realization of the national union as the insurgents themselves. The government of I. Qemal, more than others else, fought to avoid Albania's partition, and when the Great Powers, decided on Alba-

nia's dismemberment in London, it vehemently reacted. Of the same value are even to date, the warnings of the two government's delegations, addressed to the Great Powers, respectively on December 1912 and spring 1913, which stressed that without the solution of Albanian issue, no peace could be restored in the Balkans and that the division of the Albanian territories could breed nothing but a continuous hostility between the Albanians and their neigbours. The September 1913 Uprising was the first massive operation in this process of tense relations between the Albanians and their neigbours, which would be followed by other conflicts as serious as this and which consequences arer faced even now by the Albanian nation.

It is known that the Vlorë government has strongly disagreed on the manipulated borders that Europe defined to Albanian state. I. Qemal would later write in his "Memoirs" that "the main aim of his trip to Europe, which lasted from April to July 1913, was the fight for the integration of Albanian lands"(18), As he states in his "Memoirs", I. Qemal returned from Europe with a feeling of sorrow about Albania's partition but with hope that "more favourable conditions could allow Albania to realize its legitimate aspirations in the future"(19).

Highlighting the mood that prevailed among Albanians in those October days, I. Qemal stressed in his speech in Vlora that "we should not lose hope. We should always consider the fact that Kosova has been and will be part of Albania" (20).

All these facts express a defined attitude of Qemal's government. There is no doubt that the Albanians and the Vlorë government were the most interested in changing the unfairly divided borders. Due to the difficult circumstances in the country and abroad, Qemal's government was obliged to take a reserved attitude and not commit itself totally to the September 13 Uprising. At that time, the Albanian state was in difficulty. It also lacked an internal unity and this prevented it to be represented unified in the eyes of Europe. During June-July 1913, when the Vlorë government and I. Qemal, were strug-

gling to guarantee a fairer division of the country's borders, Esat Pashë Toptani set against this government. His activity continued even during the days when the September 13 Uprising was going on, around September-October, and reached its climax with the establishment of "The Council of Dignitaries of Durrës", which was a second Albanian government.

Qemal's government was prevented to take a military operation in help of the September 13 Uprising even by the neutrality status, established by the Conference of London. Under the circumstances, when the predisposition of the Great Powers, including Austria-Hungary and Italy, was lacking, every step of Qemal's government for a change of borders by force would surely be accompanied by their diplomatic and military pressures as well as the extension of Serb and Greek aggression, which even at that time was present in the Albanian territories.

All these negative factors hampered the Vlora Provisional government to realize an organized military operation and forced it to act only with diplomatic means.

Towards the end of September 1913, the Albanian Government appealed to the Great Powers to intervene and force Serbia to bring to an end its policy towards Albanians' extermination, "to mediate between the sides in conflict in order to avoid an unnecessary blood-shedding" and sent as soon as possible representatives of a Commission to delimit the borders of Albanian state. A report of the Austrio-Hungarian consul in Vlora, Lejhanec, launched on September 28, 1913, who was one of the most informed personalities of that time, reveals something more about the attitude of Qemal's government. Although the successes of the September 1913 Uprising, he wrote, and particularly the ones scored in Dibra, Struga, Gostivar and other regions, aroused much enthusiasm to the Albanian official circles and raised their hopes for a favourable solution of borders issue, the Provisional Government however was much concerned about the stopping of some inevitable reprisals against the Albanians(21). Qemal particularly asked for Vienna's and Rome's help. On September 30, he asked them to intervene to avoid a bloodshed and an imminent conflict on the Albanian-Serb borders(22).

After the suppression of the Uprising, by mid-October, the Albanians faced a double attack: the population of the invaded areas suffered massive massacres and extermination. They were forced to leave their regions, while the independent state became subject to a new attack by the Serb army, which occupied again the so-called strategic points in the areas of Dibra and Luma within the 1913 borders of Albania. Russia (23), through Neratov, asked for a territorial compensation of Serbia with Albanian lands. The crisis in the Albanian-Serb relations, where the Great Powers had a part,

#### Notes:

- 1 Arkivi Qendror i Shtetit i Republikës së Shqipërisë (më tej: AQSH), Fondi: Kuvendi Kombëtar i Vlorës, dos.1.2.
  - 2 "Liri e Shqipërisë", Sofje, 28 korrik 1913.
- 3 Qeveria e Përkohshme e Vlorës dhe veprimtaria e saj, Tiranë, 1963, dok.23, 33, 34, 35, 36.
- 4 AQSH, Fondi: Kryesia e Qeverisë së Përkohshme, dos.19. Promemorie of Albanian delegation to London Conference, April 3, 1913.
  - 5 Idem.
- 6 *Idem*, Fondi 245, viti 1913, dos.III-5/1, fl.359.
- 7 Les Atorcités des coalisés Balkaniques, nr.1, Constantinople, 1913, f.15.
- 8 Osterreish Ungars Aussenpolitik der bosnichen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914 (më tej: OUA), Telegram, 24 shtator 1013, d.nr. 8696.
- 9 Qeveria e Përkohshme e Vlorës..., dok.322.

was passed because none of these powers was interested in the eruption of a wide-world conflict neither for Serbia's or Albania's sake.

Though the September 1913 Uprising was quelled, its contribution for the national unity, occupies an important place in the history of Albanian nation, not only from its historical and social point of view but its political one as well. In the circumstances, when the Albanian issue has not yet been resolved, such attempts for the reuniting of Albanian regions, manipulated more seriously than ever, though belonging to a relatively past period, seem so close to us through the echo that they have radiated to the generations. Such an echo sounds even to date.

- 10 Idem, f.229.
- 11 Idem, dok.276, f.201-202.
- 12 A. Puto, *Pavarësia shqiptare dhe diplomacia e Fuqive të Mëdha, 1912-1914*, Tiranë, 1978.
- 13 Z. Cana, Socialdemokracia Serbe dhe çështja shqiptare 1913-1914, Prishtinë, 1986.
- 14 Qeveria Përkohshme e Vlorës...., dok.277, f.204.
  - 15 Idem, dok.281.
  - 16 Idem, dok. 288, f.204.
  - 17 Idem, dok.322, d.229.
- 18 The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bej, London, 1920, f.375.
  - 19 Idem, f.377.
- 20 AQSH, Fondi: Kuvendi Kombëtar i Vlorës, dos.II.3, Vlorë, 21 tetor 1913.
- 21 *OUA*, dos.nr.8741.Telegram, Vlorë, 28 shtator 1913.
- 22 HHSTA, PA. Telegram i I.Qemalit, 30 shtator 1913.
  - 23 A. Puto, op.cit., f. 417, 420-421.

### Dr.Ramiz ABDYLI KOSOVA THROUGH CRUCIAL YEARS (1912-1913)

"(..) Each Balkan state had snatched a piece from the Albanian lands (1912-R.A.). Delenda est Albania (to wipe Albania off the face of the earth) was the point on which they had agreed on (..)

Edith Durham

he history of Albanian people, particularly that of Kosova, is as much glorious as tragic. It is glorious because the Albanians, representing a rare example in the history of the nations, successfully stood up to the rule of many invaders and also survived the complete annihilation, especially towards the unseen Serb violence. giving this way proof for being the oldest and the most vital people in the Balkans as the distinguished Croat historian, M. Shufflay points out1. But, the Albanians, despite their big sacrifices and unusual resistance towards the foreign invaders, did not take the deserved reward by the Berlin Congress<sup>2</sup>, differently from the other Balkan countries. On the contrary, the unfair decisions of the Congress' resulted in clutching from Albania's ethnic tree some compact territories and giving them to Serbia and Montenegro.

The Albanians, though not supported by the Great Powers, as well as violated by the Ottoman Empire and always endangered by the gross appetite of the neigbouring chauvinists, did not give up their natural right for freedom and independence.

On the contrary, they, even at the price of sacrificing people, kept on organizing anti-Ottoman revolts, especially in Kosova, which since the 40ies of XIX century turned into the cradle of the war for Albania's national liberation. But,

these rebellions, besides being characterized by a rare heroism and big sacrifices, used to miscarry by right of the opponent's superiority in armaments as well as because of the Great Powers'indifference and the lack of coordination between the rebellious acts in other districts of the country. The uprisings, after being soundly defeated, were followed by the punishing crusades of the Ottoman generals, leaving the whole rebellious regions in ruins.

The Ottoman Empire responded to the Albanians' demands for their legal rights with violence, even after Hyrjet (July 1908 - re-establishment of Constitution), while the political dialogue between the Albanian MPs and the Turkish government in the Ottoman Parliament was producing no result. In such circumstances, the Albanian National Movement (ANMas follows) leaders considered part of its secular objective - the realization of the territorial and administrative autonomy of the four Albanian vilayet on a special unit<sup>4</sup>, reached through the organization of a general and national-wide' revolt.

On January 1912, some of the most notable ANM leaders, in a secret meeting in Istanbul, decided to embark by the spring of that year on a general anti-Ottoman revolt. KOSOVAwould be the cradle of this revolt, which would then spread over other parts of the country. An ANM

delegation, headed by Ismail Qemal, took on the responsibility of finding the proper material and moral support, particularly in armaments by the European countries and the Albanian Diaspora. While the other leaders, led by Hasan Prishtina, assumed the organization of the armed insurrection.

And so it happened. After making the necessary arrangements, around April 1912, the ANM leaders, headed by Hasan Prishtina, and followed by tens of thousands of supporters, gave the call-up for freedom in Malësia e Gjakoves. The revolt was spread almost all over the Vilayets of Kosova.

On May 12, 1912, Hasan Prishtina presided over in Junik (Gjakova) the Assembly of the representatives from KOSOVAVilayet, Shkodra and Dibra. This Assembly defined the political Program of the revolt, which aimed the territorial and administrative autonomy of Albania. To achieve this objective, the pledge<sup>6</sup>, which was the traditional, mandatory and potential institution, was given.

Due to the coordination of the actions over June-July 1912, the revolt assumed nation wide proportions. Tens of thousands of insurgents, led by their commanders, liberated a number of districts of Albania, especially in the North and North-Eastern parts of the KOSOVAVilayet. The Ottoman power was totally paralysed in the liberated regions<sup>7</sup>.

As the revolt was seriously threatening the Ottoman Empire, on July 17, 1912, the Turkish government was obliged to give up and its place was taken by the opposition government, which agreed to enter into negotiations with the leaders of the KOSOVAVilayet's rebels.

Besides holding talks, the ANM leadership kept on putting pressure on the Ottoman Empire to materialize the victory. So, on July 23, 1912, a meeting of the South Albania's representatives sent a memorandum to the High Porta, demanding the recognition of the territorial-administrative autonomy of Albania. Likewise, the leaders of the KOSOVAVilajet's rebels, who were thrown out of Ferizaj, having the authorization of the South and Middle

Albania, submitted on July 9, 1912 the memorandum to the High Porte. The memorandum, drawn up by Hasan Prishtina, had 14 demands. This memorandum also pointed to the territorial and administrative autonomy of Albania<sup>8</sup>.

Since the High Porte did not respond in time to the Ferizaj's memorandum, about 35.000 Albanian insurgents, led by their commanders, marched towards Skopje, the capital of KOSOVAVilayet and liberated it on August 12, 1912. The rebels freed other districts of KOSOVAVilayet and then easily took Veles, which offered no resistance. 9

After the liberation of Skopje, the rebels restored the peace and order over the city. Groups of rebels maintained a 24-hour patrol across the streets of the city. At that time, the foreign consuls used to affirm that the Albanians had established an admirable discipline over the city and taken all the necessary measures for defending the members of the Slav minority groups<sup>10</sup>.

The High Porte, facing the threat of the ANM leadership that the rebels would march towards Instambul if their threats were not fulfilled, was forced to give way. Consequently, the High Porte sent on August 18, 1912, a telegram to the leaders of Skopje's rebellion, consenting to fulfill 12 demands out of 14 presented by Ferizaj's memorandum. This was confirmed even by another telegram, on July 23, 1912. Hasan Prishtina, who was at that time in Skopje, informed the leaders of the Middle and South Albania's ANM about this agreement. The news aroused much enthusiasm everywhere.

The Albanian autonomous concessions, won through the blood of thousands of martyrs, terrified the governments of the Balkan countries, as they thwarted their projects on breaking Albania into pieces. This was the very reason constraining them to sign the mutual agreement (among Serbia, Greece, Montenegro and Bulgaria), called the Balkan Alliance, which, created under the pretext of freeing their brothers, aimed to divide this part of the Balkans among them.

The Great Powers, which were in favour of preserving the "status quo" in the Balkans, did

not support the Albanian autonomous concessions, granted by the High Porte.

An autonomous Albania was strongly opposed by Russia, which through the Balkans' Slav countries, pretended to clutch land from Albania and occupy the strategic positions in the Adriatic and Mediterranean.

Only Austria-Hungary was sympathetic to the idea of an autonomous Albania but considered that for the moment as a hasty step. The Foreign Minister of this country, Brechtold, proposed to the Great Powers to take a collective step in applying the gradual decentralization policy towards the Ottoman Empire in order to conform to the new ethnic proportions<sup>11</sup>, which presupposed the step-by-step solution of the Albanian issue.

While the Albanians had started to put the concessions into effect by replacing the Turk employees with Albanian ones<sup>12</sup>, the First World War broke out on October 9, 1912. Consequently, the Balkan Alliance states, declared war to the Ottoman Empire. Montenegro and Serbia invaded the Albanian north-east regions, Greece attacked the Vilayet of Ionnina and the southern part of Albania consequently, while Bulgaria the Eastern Roumelia.

The Albanians, being in the position of "toeing the mark", as a political analyst used to say at that time, were obliged to rank themselves among the Ottoman army for defending their lands from the neigbouring chauvinists. In such a critical moment for the country's fate, on October 14, 1912, some of the ANM leaders, after establishing the "Salvation" Committee in Skopje, wrote a memorandum, informing the Great Powers that the Albanians had taken up arms "to protect the territorial integrity of Albania"13. The Albanian volunteer forces, ranged with the units of the Ottoman army, and established from Prepollac and Kumanova to Manastir, put up an heroic resistance to the Serb and Montenegrin armies. They were conscious that by sacrificing their lives, they were defending not only their regions but the whole Albania. However, the Serb and Montenegrin armies, making use of the Ottoman generals' treachery, broke down the heroic resistance of the Albanian volunteers in Kumanova. Furthermore, the Serb army, different from the Albanian volunteer forces, who offered much resistance, met no opposition by the Ottoman army. The Serb army soon invaded Macedonia and then entered the Albanian shores through three directions. In the meantime, the Montegrin army, after occupying Malësia e Shkodrës, Plava and Gucia, besieged Shkodra. On the other hand, the Greek army was penetrating into the Middle Albania after conquering its southern part.

As Albania was under the threat of being erased from the map of the Balkans, an Albanian delegation, headed by Ismail Qemal, after meeting with the Albanian diaspora in Bucharest, went to Vienna where he got the consent of the Austro-Hungary government to declare Albania's independence. After informing even the representatives of Italy and England in Austria-Hungary about this question, the Albanian delegation soon returned to the country to organize a national assembly, which was held in Vlora on November 28, 1912, with the participation of the delegates from all the Albanian regions. On the same day, the historic verdict for the proclamation of Albania's Independence14 was announced.

The historic act of proclaiming the national independence and re-hoisting Skanderbeg's flag, crowned the long war of the Albanian people for national liberation.

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Over the occupied areas of Albania, the invading armies of Serbia, Greece and Montenegro mounted punishing expeditions with the aim to exterminating the Albanian people. They caused many victims and a lot of destruction. The eyewitness of such events, E.Durham, citing Cato the Elder, has compared such expeditions with the barbarous destructions of Cartagene by the Roman army, saying "Delente est Albania" (Albania should be wiped off the face of the earth)<sup>15</sup>.

Albania's invasion was harshly contested by

the Tripartite forces, especially by Austro-Hungary and Italy. In response, the Conference of the Ambassadors was held in London. The Conference, participated by six European countries (Austro-Hungary, Germany, Italy, England, Russia and France), would discuss the issue, raised after to the expulsion of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans and that of the Ionian isles.

The Conference, chaired by the English Premier, Eduard Grey, started on December 17, 1912 and concluded on July 29, 1913. Almost all the time, the Conference focused on the Albanian issue. In its first meeting, the Conference decided to proclaim Albania an autonomous state under the Sultan's sovereignty, while the final decision of the Conference, announced on July 29, 1913, declared Albania a sovereign and neutral country, controlled by the Great Powers.

Albania's borders issue caused much disagreements and concern among the participant countries. Conflicts were harsher between Austro-Hungary and Russia. On one hand. Austro-Hungary insisted on the creation of a state with somewhat Albanian ethnic borders, while Russia, on the other hand, was for a smaller Albania. The Albanian delegation, deterred from attending the Conference, requested the inclusion of the regions, mostly inhabitated by the Albanians, within the territory of Albania. In the end, for the sake of good understanding among the Great powers, the Conference reached a compromise, which consisted in leaving more than half of the Albanian ethnic regions (more than 35 km<sup>2</sup> metres and about 1.000,000 inhabitants) out of the borders of Albanian state. Only Serbia and Montenegro increased their surfaces by 24.000 km<sup>2</sup> metres at the expense of Albanian ethnic regions. While the Albanian region of Cameria, with a total surface of 11.000 km<sup>2</sup> metres, was annexed to Greece.

According to this Conference, Serbia was enlarged by 39.000 km² metres, Greece by 51.000 km² metres and Montenegro by 7.000 km² metres<sup>16</sup>.

So, it can be said that Albania's separation

by the Conference of the Ambassadors totally disregarded the historical criteria as well as the ethnic and justice principles<sup>17</sup>. At that time, Dimitrije Tucoviq rightly noted that this Conference had done much harm to Albanian people<sup>18</sup>. Meantime, Lord Lamington, in the debates at the British Parliament about the issue, deemed the Balkan War a warfare, whose only aim was "to occupy territories and annihilate the population"<sup>19</sup>.

These years, quite critical for the history of the Albanian people, especially for Kosova and the other Albanian regions in the former-Federation of Yugoslavia, and for Cameria in particular, represent the years of tragedy as well as the start of the long process of the Albanians' denationalisation by the organized state violence of the Serb-Montegrin and Greek invaders. For its resistance and the undeniable contribution against the Ottoman invasion, the Albanian people was rewarded with a state, naturally and ethnically able to be developed, with some manipulated borders, restricted to some rocky parts along the seashores.

The decisions of the Conference of the Ambassadors in London, which sealed the fate for more than half of the Albanian ethnic regions, were not corrected even by the following conferences of the Great Powers, such as the Conference of Versaja (1919-1920), Conference of Paris (1945) and lastly the Conference of London (1992).

These decisions, which realized the annexation of some of the Albanian invaded regions to Serbia, Montenegro and Greece, marked the start of the systematic violence and genocide on the Albanians, a process which dates back from 1912 and continues even to date with the only aim to conduct ethnic cleansing against the Albanians. To escape such an unseen violence, hundreds of thousands of Albanians were forced to leave the country of their—forefathers and settle in Turkey, Albania etc.

In the meantime, Serbia and Montenegro, despite the violence and genocide, they exerted on, failed to reach their objective: the ethnic cleansing of the Albanians in Kosova and other regions of the former-Federation of Yugosla-

via. While Greece managed to totally denationalise the Albanian region of Çameria and change it into a purely Greek ethnic area.

\* \* \*

After the 90ies, when the democratization process began in the Eastern Europe, the Albanian people in the former-Federation of Yugoslavia, was waiting for the Great Powers to correct their errors in the wake of the fall of the Berlin wall in Albania. But, instead, the Conference of London (1992), separated the Albanians of the former-Federation of Yugoslavia into three Slav countries: KOSOV Aand Presheva as well as Bujanovc and Medvegja further remained under Serbia's control, some under the Republic of Macedonia and others under Montenegro.

The Albanian people in Kosova, as well as other parts of it in Macedonia, Montenegro

and South Serbia, as an historically integral part of the Albanian people, should be recognized the right of self-determination, as a legitimate right to live in a common state like other people. The complete disregard of this natural right would necessarily exclude the alternative of solving peacefully the Kosova issue and the war would remain the only solution to definitely throw off the Serb yoke. Consequently, the astounding courage and readiness of the Kosova youth, ranged with the Kosova Liberation Army units, would challenge their compatriots in Macedonia and Albania. Then, Albania's and Macedonia's involvement in the war would be made inevitable, transforming the Albanian-Serb conflict into a Third Balkan War. So, it depends on the Great Powers to correct their errors, done at Kosova's and Albanians' expense.

#### Notes:

1 M. Shufflay, Serbët dhe shqiptarët, Prishtinë, 1968, f.73, 108. "(...) the Albanian ethos is the most ancient and deep-rooted in the Balkan Peninsula (...) the stone as a cushion and the land as a mattress (...)".

2 Since the 30-ies of XIX century, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and later Bulgaria, with the support of Great Powers, especially of Russia, won their authonomy and then independence.

3 Sh.Rahimi, *Vilajeti i Kosovës*, Prishtinë, 1969, f.132-163.

4 The four Albanian- inhabited vilayets were: Vilayets of Shkodra with 10 700 km square metres, Kosova, 32 000km square metres, Manastir, 28 500 km square metres and Janina with 17 800 km square metres.

5 Z. Cana, Lëvizja Kombëtare në Kosovë 1908-1912, Prishtinë, 1979; H. Prishtina, Nji Shkurtim kujtimesh mbi kryengritjen shqiptare të vitit 1912, Shkodër, 1921.

6 N. Koleci, Kryengritja e përgjithshme shqiptare kundër sundimit turk në vitin 1912, Tiranë, 1962, f.54.

7 K.Prifti, Dervish Hima, Tiranë, 1993,

f.304-305.

8 H.Prishtina, op.cit., f.29.

9 N. Koleci, op. cit., f. 87.

10 E. Durham, *Brenga e Ballkanit*, Tiranë, 1990, f.386; Z. Cana, *Lëvizja Kombëtare Shqiptare...*, f.270-271; Hadživasilević Jovan, *Skolje i njegova okolina*, Beograd, 1930, f.560; Sh. Rahimi, *Vilajeti i Kosovës*, f.186.

11 Z.Cana, op.cit., f.276.

12 "Serbobran", Beograd, 9 November 1912.

13 Akte të Rilindjes Kombëtare Shqiptare. Tiranë, 1978, dok.169, f.255-256.

14 Qeveria e Përkohshme e Vlorës dhe veprimtaria e saj, Tiranë, 1963, f.44-45.

15 E.Durham, op.cit., f.386.

16 Položaj Albanije na Balkanu, in: "La Fédération Balkanique", nr.4-5, Wien, 1924.

17 K. Prifti, Kryengritja e shtatorit të vitit 1913 dhe çështja e bashkimit kombëtar të shqiptarëve, "Jehona", nr.6, Shkup, 1993, f.7.

18 D.Tukovic, *Serbija e Shqipnija*, Prishtinë, 1946, f.63.

19 Z.Cana, Socialdemokracia serbe dhe çështja shqiptare, Prishtinë, 1986, f.244.

## TRENDS OF MUSICAL CREATIONS OVER THE CENTURIES

he Albanian musical creations have been more slowly developed and intertwined with the other European musical cultures. Their trends of development have been influenced by the historical events, due to the Byzantine, Bulgarian, Serb and Ottoman invasions. The fine arts, such as literature and architecture, presented over XV-XVIII centuries well-known names including, A.Aleksi, Gj.Gazulli, L.Tomeo, M.Maruli, M.Beçikemi, M.Barleti, Onufri, M.Sinani, Gj.Buzuku, L.Matrënga, S.M.Biçakçiu, P.Budi, F.Bardhi, P.Bogdani, Gj.N.Kazazi, S.Kavaljoti, D.Selenicasi, LShpataraku, Dh.Haxhiu, J. Variboba, J.Cetir Grabovari etc<sup>1</sup>, whose works are valuable. Whereas the Albanian musical creations have been developed and integrated into the European musical trends much later the Italians, the French, the Spanish, the Germans and the English have established the basis of their own musical creations since XIII-XVI centuries. The Albanians have created their own musical culture through their rich metricalrhythmical and melodic songs and dances, accompanied by the musical instruments, as well as through the songs, sung in the churches, monasteries and cathedrals.

Let's speak of the well-known medieval musician of the XII century<sup>2</sup>, Jan Kukuzel (Joan Kukusel, Johannes Kukuzeles), who carried his musical activity abroad and gave a great contribution to the international musical creations. Jan Kukuzeli was born in Durrës (Albania). He at-

tended studies and served to the Byzantine palace of Constantinople and later to the Sacred Mountain at Athos Isle, where he composed the following musical vocal works: the biblical Psalm no:117, Lauds no:148-150, Trope of Nativity, Cherub's Song, Polielej, Isoja e madhe papadike, Aniksantar etc, and the theoretical works like the notation system, called Kukuzel's system, which made him a well-known and valuable personality of music for many centuries. For that purpose, some historians have tried to "arrogate" his origin to themselves by "changing" his birthplace3. Although the wellknown publications (say, Megali eleniki enkuklopaideia) do make suppositions on his origin, attempts have been made to give to him a Bulgarian nationality(!?), by taking use of his surname, formed by the two compound words "kukia" (Greek) and "zele" (Slav) or by the fact that one of his musical policlej was dedicated to a Bulgarian woman (who allegedly has been his mother). But, such facts can not deny his origin. However, scholar Ramadan Sokoli says, naionality can not be denied only because the mother is of another nationality or because an author has written in Greek (as Kukuzel has done) since the latter, besides Latin, has been the official language of the Byzantine Empire. Consequently, such assumptions do not impinge at all on his origin or birthplace. What remains facts for this compositor are: his origin from a Durres family and the integration of elements, called "barbarisms" by the Greeks (i.e foreign

words, which also are related to his origin, which is neither Bulgarian nor Greek) into his music as well as the existence of his portrait <sup>4</sup> on a fresco in the Ardenica Monastery in Fier (Albania), painted by Zografi brothers during the XVIII century. All these facts speak for themselves. It is up to the musicologists to throw light on his national origin in order to definitely remove all this veil of doubt<sup>5</sup>.

Even during the XIV-XVI centuries, wellknown Albanian families have been forced to emigrate to Ragusa and other countries because of the Ottoman invasions. This holds good for many generations of activists6 and musicians, who emigrated from Durres, Drisht, Shkodra, Lezha and other Albanian regions, to Ragoza and this can be confirmed by the Dubrovnik<sup>7</sup> libraries and archives. Some of these musicians are: Kolë Durrësaku (Colla de Durachio), who was a cornet player and a gifted instrumentalist in Ragusa over the years 1394-1404; Filip Drishtaku (Filipus de Drivasto), a cornet player over the years 1441-1461 and instrument-maker especially of the noted instrument "dulce melos" (similar to clavichord). Filip Drishtaku has visited many countries including Venedik, Split, Ancona, as well as Drisht and his birthplace, the village of Angar. In his absence, his son, Vlashi played cornet. After his death, his other son, Helias played this instrument. Pjetër Shpendi (Petrus Spanus) came from a notable Albanian generous family. He was a chaplain and organ teacher; Jan Augustin Durrësaku (Zanetus Augustini de Durachio) was distinguished as a trombonist and a musician in the musical chaplaincy of Duke of Ragusa during the years 1484-1495; Martin Balistari (Martinus Balisterius) was the maker of "organo a bracci" and "bombardo"8 instruments, by the end of XIV century. These notable musicians and others too have greatly contributed to the flourishing of the musical life in the environments where they have lived.

The Albanians enjoyed themselves with the rich folk songs and dances and chorales, which constituted the whole musical life. During XVII-XVIII, well-known families from the "southern areas" immigrated. Among them, there were the distinguished generous family of Sorgo(9) with the compositors Luka (1734-1789) and his son Antonin (1775-1841), known in the Croat historiography as Sorkocevic. They became fa-

mous in Ragusa and further with their musical vocal, vocal-instrumental, chamber music and orchestral works. With their creations, they enriched the musical culture of Dubrovnik in particular and the Croat culture in general.

The XIX century brought much more conscious authors, who injected patriotism in their musical works, which were in form and genre wholly permeated by a national character. Some of these authors were Vladimir Gj. Kastrioti (1820-1879), who has lived in Petersburg. He has dedicated much of his musical works to his motherland and forefathers, while others have not yet seen the light of day or have not been studied. This author has been highly appreciated by his contemporaries such as: M. Glinka, A. Dargomizhski etc. with whom he made friends. This has been also proved by a letter of Dargomizhski, who reminds to him of the Beethoven's Symphony, which they had once played together on piano. In this letter, Dargomizhski encourages Vladimir to compose a quartet cantata. The authority of Vladimir Gj. Kastrioti has been proved even by some obituaries in the Russian, Czhec papers etc. Of the same period, there was the musician of the National Renaissance, Harallamb K. Koçi, whose family emigrated to Odesë in 1878, after the failure of Olymp revolt against Turkey. During 1892-1894, Koci, after finishing the seminar, became a monk and travelled over the South-Eastern Albanian areas, where he collected folk music pieces and later published them. As soon as he returned to Russia, he attended the musical studies in Petersburg. There, he was involved in familiarizing the Russian public opinion with the past of his own country through public debates, media and concerts. In a concert, entitled "Albanian Evenings", attended by artists and the choir and ballet troupe of the Russian Empire, "Korça songs", ballads, romances as well as "Albanian dances and songs", performed in traditional costumes, were conducted by Koçi. Some of his marches as well as various musical parts and an opera10 are in manuscript.

Over this time and at the turn of XX century, though under the difficult conditions of Ottoman invasion, the professional and charismatic musician, Palok Kurti wrote music in Albania. He was the conductor of Shkodra Orchestra and Choir (1878) and the composer of various orchestral parts

(dances, pot-pourri, suites) and folk songs (Marshalla bukurisë sate, Një këllëf t'artë ta çova, Ta dish etc). Most of these songs have become quite precious to people. Besides Isuf Myzyri (Elbasan 1880-1956) with his songs (Iku nata agu'n malet, Një lulishtë me drandofilla, Ç'u dëshrush me të pa, Në zabel të erdha etc) another author who became famous, was Eftim Kovaçi with his lyrical songs and romances such as "Kroi I fshatit tonë" with verses were written by the lyricist Lasgush Poradeci<sup>11</sup> In addition, the pianist Lola Gjoka has composed a set of piano pieces and some parts, arranged for voice. A few lyrics and romances have been composed by the tenor, Kristaq Antoniu.

Until the eve of the WW II, the musician Thoma Nase made a lot of lyrical songs such as "Pra erdhi vera" and the revolutionary-patriotic song "Vlora-Vlora", composed in 1920 in dedication to the War and Vlora's protection from the Italian imperialists. Petro Kosta achieved fame with the "Triumphal March", (1926), arranged for voice and piano. The part, published in the USA, was a dedication to Skanderbeg. In 1920, Petro Kosta, accompanied by the musical band of American (pan-Albanian) association "Vatra" and 200 Albanian volunteers from the USA, came to Albania to contribute for Vlora's protection. After returning to the USA, he, through various brochures and musical publications, continued to contribute for Albanian musical culture 13. Marin Gjoka (Tivar, 1890 - Shkodra, 1940) did most of his compositions during this period of time. He was a cultured musician, professor and conductor of Shkodra Orchestra and founder of "Rozafat" (1918) and "Illyricum" (1922) choirs, as well as author of the compositions: "Rapsodi mbi kangë popullore shqipe" ("Rapsodies on Albanian folk songs") for orchestra and wind instruments, the hymn "Porsi fleta e engllit t'Zotit" (1913), "Te ura Shalës" for flute and piano, "Pastoral" for orchestra, and the Psalm no:137 "Buzë lumejve të Babilonit". He was the author of the unfinished melodrama "Juda Makabe" (1917) and composer of other melodramas and the symphony "Dy lule mbi vorr të Skanderbegut" (1922). Most of his compositions(14), especially ("Dy lule në ..) bear special significance and historical values. Fan Noli (Qyteza e Ibrik Tepesë 1882 - Philadelphia, USA, 1965) known as a poet, publicist, statesman and bishop, belonged to this generation. At the age of 50, around the 30ies, he studied composition at the New England Conservatoire and got a degree. He then showed complete mastery of composition on which he has been keen since long. Besides the musical works: "Hymnore" (1936) and "Byzantine hymnal" (1959) for mixed choir, the Psalm no: 137 "Buzë lumenjve të Babilonit" for mixed choir, he became famous with the symphonic poem "Skanderbeg", "Albanian rhapsody" for orchestra15 and "Gaspër I varfër", arranged for tenor and orchestra. The symphonic poem "Skanderbeg" 16 is a very interesting work with regard to its content and orchestral formation since the past has been poor in such works. Over the last century and the turn of the XX century, many orchestral works have been mentioned but Noli's marked a step forward and moreover competed with the works of European composers in respect to their architecture. musical theme and compositional technique. It is based on some themes of various characters and on the poem with the same title of Longfellow!". The first theme has an epic-lyric character and it is dedicated to Skanderbeg. It has many modulations, a fact which shows that Noli has analysed the contemporary works. The second contrasted and onental theme, is named "ezanin e myezinit". This one sharply contrasts with the other theme, which has a vivacious character. It describes the environment where Skanderbeg has been brought up, while the call-up theme has an heroic character and gives to the work an epic character. The oriental and epiclyric themes have been arranged with an Anglican liturgical melody and the Albanian song "Edhe gurët e sokakut", which symbolizes Skanderbeg's return to his own country. Through repressing the oriental theme and the liturgical melody with the aim of highlighting the urge for being liberated from the Ottoman invasion, the author put the stress on the Ottoman aggression. This symphonic poem has dramatic features, adequate architecture and a compositional technique. The poem has a colourful combined sound and polyphonic elements, arranged in a flexible way and in accordance with the work's subject. Likewise, "The Albanian Rhapsody" for orchestra, is based on some themes, suggested by the title itself. They come one after the other and produce orchestral contrasts while the rhythmic-metrical and agog elements refresh it up. What attracts attention, is a fine sound of instruments and orchestral sections, realized by the orchestration. The work has lyrical and elegiac elements. Whereas "Gaspëri I varfër", arranged for tenor and an orchestra, has been based on the homonymous work of P. Vërlen<sup>18</sup> and is then transformed into a lyrical three-part poem. The part is well-arranged while the orchestral instruments and groups dominate. The close relation between the form, musical content and poem, is well-realised. Some homophonic-polyphonic elements emerge while elements of chamber music with a note of melancholy have been realised in the orchestral facture. The melodies of "Marseiesa", and "Internationale", through which the revolutionary-proletarian ideas were expressed and the later Nazi-fascist19 invasion was warned, have served as basic themes. All these works of Noli made a great contribution to Albanian music and further developed the respective genders. The use of national events and popular and revolutionary themes as a reference reinforces the conviction that they have contributed to Albanian musical culture and have been closely related to European music.

Over the later periods, other musicians emerged such as: Shime Deshpali (arbëresh from Zara, 1897-Zare, 1981) who was a well-educated musician, professor and conductor of choruses and orchestras. He was the composer of the coral songs ("Lenës"; "Lulëzoi lulja", Dashnor t'u bana", "O moj ky Mehmeti"; "Valle", "Moj Shaje" etc, solo songs ("Ndeshja", "Funtoma"), pioners' songs ("Neta", "Zogu", "Nxanësi I rregullt", "Kanon", "Qepësja e vogël", "Kënga bareshe"), instrumental parts (Danësi I Lulëzës", for piano), orchestral parts ("Moba" for harp orchestra) Murat Shehu (Berat, 1897- Philadelphia, USA, 1978), emigrated to USA and died longing for his motherland. During his career, he composed five orchestral rhapsodies (the last two rhapsodies have lost), which are based on Albanian popular themes. The rhapsodies have been performed even by the Philadelphia State Opera. The author has composed solo songs ("Shqipëria e re", "Marshi I Skënderbeut", Bilbil Xhezari") etc.: Pieter Dungu was a collector of folk songs over the period between the two wars (the brief recapitulation "Lyra shqiptare"; Novara 1940); he was a composer of folk songs and of the operetta ("Rrjeta e artë") Kristo Kono (Korcë, 1903-1991), was the author of coral and vocal-instrumental works ("Borova", "Malli për Atdhe), "Labëria"), orchestral parts (rhapsodies, suits) and musical-stage-adapted works (the operettas "Agimi", "Brigadierja"; opera "Lulja e kujtimit" Abdullah Grimci created choral songs, vocal-instrumental, orchestral (symphony) and musical-stage-adapted works (opera: "Bijtë e Skënderbeut") Lorenc Antoni (Skopje, 1908 - Prishtinë, 1991) is distinguished for 7 folk music collections, entitled "Folklori muzikor shqiptar", some etnomusicological works, recapitulation of some choral songs ("Kore Shqiptare", "Jehona e zemrës", "Një gafore defatore", "Trumcakët e Kosovës", elaborated songs for solists, choirs and orchestra, orchestral songs: "Suita Kosovare", "Në Prizrenin e bukur", "Malësorja" and some rhapsodies and Albanian dances, "Në Prizrenin e vjetër" etc(20) Konstantin Trako (1913) was the author of coral, vocal-instrumental works ("Partia" etc) and orchestral works such as (the poem: "Vendi im") etc. Prenk Jakova (Shkodra, 1919-1969) was a music professor, conductor of ansembles and composer of coral, orchestral and musical-stageadapted parts (the operas "Mrika" and "Gjergj Kastrioti Skënderbeu").

The composers, who wrote music during the periods between the two wars, later became distinguished as talented composers of famous musical works. Among them, there were R. Mulliqi (1923-1982), who wrote choral songs and arrangements, vocal-instrumental, orchestral and musical stage-adapted pieces; C.Zadeja, choral songs and arrangements, solo-chamber music, orchestral concert-adapted and musical stageadapted works. T.Daija, coral, instrumental-orchestral and musical stage-adapted pieces; A.Mula, vocal-instrumental and musical stageadapted; N. Zoraqi, instrumental, orchestralsymphonic and musical stage-adapted compositions; S.Gjoni, vocal-instrumental and orchestral symphonic works; K.Lara, concertadapted, vocal-instrumental and musical stage-adapted parts; T. Hoshafi, vocal-instrumental and orchestral compositions; P.Gaci, concert-adapted, vocal-instrumental and musical-stage-adapted pieces; F.Ibrahimi, solochamber music, concert-adapted and vocalinstrumental works; E.Rizvanolli, solo-chamber music, vocal-instrumental, orchestral-symphonic and coral parts; V.Gjini, coral, vocalinstrumental and symphonic works; F.Beqiri, solo, coral and orchestral parts etc. Some of these composers have studied composition abroad, mastering knowledges that compete with the European standards. These authors, besides enriching the national musical creations, have contributed even to the European musical creations as they come from an ancient country with a creative vocation and a western outlook and culture. Consequently, their artistically realised works, performed in Albania and abroad, are an integral part of the European musical culture.

### Notes:

- 1 Sh. Nimani, *Onufri dhe piktorë të tjerë mesjetarë shqiptarë*, NGBG "Rilindja" dhe Galeria e arteve, Prishtinë, 1987, f.11-19.
- 2 "Muzička enciklopedija II", JLZ, Zagreb, 1974, pg..39, it is stated that he might have lived even during the XIV C.
- 3 "Muzička enciklopedija" defines that he was born in Gjermenci (Dibra), "Povijest glazbe I" of J. Andreis, *Sveučilišna naklada "Liber*", Zagreb, 1989, pg.114 writes that "... Durrës (Albania) has been considered as his birthplace...".
- 4 R. Sokoli, "Figura të ndritura", "Naim Frashëri", Tiranë, 1965, f.5-19, 44-51.
- 5 There have been cases when the authors'origin has been ambiguous, for example, Jacobos Gallus Corniollus, 1550-1591, has written in Latin, in some of the German and Czhech reagions but the researches of the Slovene musicologist, D.Ovetko, revealed that the surname Gallus in Slovenia is Petelin while Carniollus is Kranjska, Slovenia.
- 6 J. Drançolli, *Disa aspekte të* marrëdhënieve shqiptaro-raguzane gjatë Mesjetës, "Fjala", 1 shkurt 1986.
- 7 J. Andreis in "Povijest glazbe" IV..., pg.39 writes that: "the musical life has been flourished by musicians from the city and suburbans as well as from other countries like Italy, Germany, Greece, Albania.
- 8 J. Drançolli, Muzikantët shqiptarë në Raguzë gjatë shek. XIV-XV, "Fjala", 1 mars

1985.

- 9 In his book "Raguzanët në Kosovë", J.Drançolli, stresses that the Albanian families, which were settled in Kosova in service to Ragusa, acted as missionaries, judges, administrators, consuls, merchants etc. On pg.53, he writes: "... an important role was played by the Ragusian patrician of Albanian ancestry, Pasquale de Sorgo..." while on pg.78: "... which was given by Andrea Sorgo, a hospitale Ragusian of Albanian origin...".
- 10 R. Sokoli, Figura e Skënderbeut në muzikë, "8 Nëntori", Tiranë, 1978, f.46-47.
- 11 S. Kalemi S.Çefa, *Historia e muzikës shqiptare* 1-2, "Libri shkollor", Tiranë, 1979, f.89.
  - 12. Idem.
  - 13 R. Sokoli, op.cit., f.48.
- 14 V. Malaj, Apostolsko i kulturno djelovanje franjevaca medju vjernicima albanskog naroda.
- 15 In "Fan S. Noli 5", OPGBG "Rilindja", 1988, pg.146, this title has been substituted with "Uvertura bizantine"!
- 16 R.Sokoli, *Figura e Skënderheut...* f.49-50.
- 17 His poem "Skënderbeu", translated by Noli, can be found at "Fan S. Noli 1, OPGBG "Rilindja", 1998, pg.116-121.
- 18 Fan S. Noli 1, "Rilindja", Prishtinë, 1988, pg.147.
- 19 Fan S. Noli 7, OPGBG "Rilindja", Prishtinë, 1988, pg.559-570.
- 20 Z.Ballata, *Gjurmëve të muzës*, OPGBG "Rilindja", Prishtinë, 1987, f.59-68.

## A PARALLEL BETWEEN KOSOVA AND SERBIA IN A DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE

he demographic dimensions of the Kosova issue have been a discussion point by all the Serb and Yugoslav circles and regimes for more than one century. To accomplish their aspirations for dominance and hegemony over Kosova and the Albanians, these circles and regimes have speculated not only upon the so-called "the historic right", but continue even to date to manipulate with the "demographic argument" in order to consider Kosova as an exclusively Serb question. After 1981, during the widespread campaign against Kosova and the Albanians, the demographic problems of the Albanians were transformed without being based at all on the trational judgement. Frightened by the large number of the Albanians, their extensive spread over a compact territory and particularly their demographic perspective in Kosova, former-Yugoslavia and the Balkans, and allegedly because of putting in danger the Serb-Yugoslav territory as well as the geodemographic, national, political and economic prosperity of the southern Slavs, the political-state and the scientific circles in former-Yugoslavia, started to openly count the Albanians and express the Albania-phobia all over the regions and the social strata

of the southern Slavs, especially the Serbs, Macedonians and the Montegrins. The Albania-phobia was so openly expressed that the neo-maltusianist and racist(1) background could not be covered up.

Let's analyse some population projections of the Serb and Yugoslav demographic and statistical institutions on Kosova, where the demographic transition process is not yet carried out and on Serbia as well where this process has already concluded and the demographic crisis along with the economic, political and moral ones, have reached a critical stage with long-term consequences. Since the prejudices and the chauvinism towards Kosova and the Albanians assumed massive proportions, it is unavoidable to be suspicious of the Serb's and Yugoslav's political and state circles'recommandations on these projections.

The expert demographers always stress that the selection and the efficient application of the methods on the drafting of the demographic projections depends on the population density, "closed population" (without immigration), "open population" (with immigration), type and length of projections, (short-term, medium-term and long-term). Furthermore, it depends on whether the projections

analyze object the demographic components in their narrow meaning (fertility, mortality, number of married couples, formulation of the nation-wide population without the influence of the migrant populations or whether they analyze components in their wide meaning (social and economic structure, population's migrations etc).

The presented demographic projections belong to the period 1991-2150, whose proportion of demographic prospective between Kosova and Serbia and the population's position and geo-political position of Kosova and the Albanians in the Balkans is related to the general size of the population, fertility level, infant mortality and the population structure according to age and gender. In all the presented projections, the analytical method is applied while in most of the cases, the component of population's migration is ignored.

The mortality assumptions have been presented considering one or two variants in these projections, while as for the fertility rate (number of births in proportion with the female population over the procreation period of 15-49 years) has been presented taking into account three to eight variants. For the period 1991-2150, the eight variants have been displayed but for practical reasons all of them have been restricted to only three. These two components, the mortality and fertility, are dependent on the future change in the size and the structure of the population according to age and gender as well as other demographic indicators. For some projections, the reference basis, for both Kosova and Serbia, has been the 1981 census, while a 1991 census has been taken into account for a 1993 projection on Serbia. Whereas for Kosova, an estimation of the population has been made since the Albanians for already known reasons, did not take part in the census of this year. This new and long-term projection refers to the period prior to the destruction of former-Yugoslavia.

Because of the mentioned reasons, the projection on the number of Kosova and Serbia populations, may fall short of the expectations, but it is sure that around 2061, a complete demographic equilibrium would be reached between Kosova and Serbia; the equal numerical proportion 1:1 or 5m inhabitants to 5m inhabitants would be established. But, in Serbia, around 800,000 inhabitants or 15 percent of the population will be non-Serbian inhabitants: Bosnians. Albanians. Montenegrins, Gypsies, Vlachs and other unidentified population groups. According to the median variant projection, Kosova will register a total of 4.5m inhabitants in 2050 while Serbia only 5m inhabitants. It is foreseen that in the year 2100, Kosova will have more than 5m inhabitants and Serbia around 4.5m inhabitants, while in the year 2150, such differences will reach approximately these numerical proportions or will change in fayour to a demographic volume of Kosova and the Albanians.

According to the median variant projection in question, during the period 1991-2150, the ratio of annual natural population growth, expressed in one per thousands, will be 6.06 for Kosova while for Serbia minus 1,61. The Serb ethnic community in Kosova will be totally marginalized and reduced by less than two percent of the whole population of Kosova since at the half of the next century, while this community, in comparison to the total number of the Serbs in the Balkans, will constitute only 0,3 percent.

While speaking about the demographic perspective between Kosova and Serbia, the Albanians and the Serbs, on the basis of the so far manifested tendencies, and rather on the basis of the projections, the differences will be structurally and qualitatively greater: according to the medium variant, in the year 2021, the age group 0-14 years old will make

up 26,4 percent of the population while the age group over 65 year old only 5,3 percent of the population of Kosova. Whereas in Serbia, the age group 0-14 will constitute 18.7 percent while the age-group 65 year old and up only 16,1 percent of the population. Such figures foresee the ageing of population, which will have an increasing tendency after the 20-ies of next century. After these years, there is predicted a decline in the infant mortality in Kosova up to the level of the developed countries which will directly influence on the population growth. According to this fertility variant, i.e in 2050, the age-groups 15-64 years old (which represent the period of work for most of the members of this group) will be equalized both absolutely and relatively: Serbia, with a total of 5m inhabitants, will have 2.926.000 people while Kosova (with 4.5m inhabitants) will have 2.889.000 people of that age. Under such conditions, Serbia will be short of labour power. In the years 2100 and 2150, the contingent of young and average age in Kosova would be obviously larger than in Serbia.

Almost all the projections do not pay much attention to the mortality assumptions in Kosova; one of them stresses that over the periods the projections would be realized, the mortality rate would be constant, while another one shows that the mortality is going to further decrease, especially the infant mortality, which would be a source of population growth. A 1990 projection does not foresee a substantial fall of the infant mortality until 2016. A greater importance has been attached to the fertility (natality) assumptions. This is shown in some variants, among which the most reliable one is considered the medium fertility variant. According to this variant, the level of fertility in Kosova, under the influence of the modernization processes in the Kosova-Albanian society and relating to that, the accelerated demographic transition period,

will show a downward tendency, but it would not reach the level of the simple reproduction of the generations. In the year 2016, the total fertility rate (2) in Kosova and Serbia will be respectively around 2,60 and 1,9 children. In Serbia, since 1990, the fertility rate has been 7,280 children or 1,2 births per 1000 inhabitants. While the fertility rate for the Serbs in Kosova was only 760 inhabitants, the rest of the fertility rate constituted the other ethnic communities, (Bosnians, Albanians, Gypsies etc)(3).

Referring to the 1991 census, 3.130 settlements out of 4.217 estimated in Serbia, registered a negative population growth or zero growth(4). Such trends have rapidly gone towards lower rates, so Serbia presently registers a negative population growth, while in the villages, a total demographic decline is being registered since long.

But, besides Kosova's advantages against Serbia, with regard to the total size of population and its structure versus age, Kosova too will face problems deriving from the demographic components. First of all, the density of population, according to the medium fertility variant, will increase from 200 inhabitants per square metres (the current level) to 410 inhabitants in the year 2050 and to 470 inhabitants by the year 2100, when this index is foreseen to be stabilised at this level. Such a demographic state surely will have its own effects on other fields but this aspect is not going to be discussed in this article. Stress also should be put on the nature of the longterm demographic projections, which is likely to lead to the dramatization of the consequences that crop up from the projected trends of the population growth.

On the basis of the afore-mentioned population structure according to the age and consequently to the average number of live births by a woman over her fertile period (15-49 years old), all the Serb circles have considered the

demographic situation in Serbia as quite catastrophic and with big and long-term implications for the economic, social, national and state life. In spite of the attempts and the fuss of the Serb scientific and state institutions, the character of the demographic processes, especially that of population growth, as the most complicated and private sphere of the human life, appears in such a way showing that Serbia has a few chances to reach success in the rehabilitation of their reproductive capacity and the aimed regeneration of the demographic mobility and structure in general. In this case, there should be taken into consideration also the direct and the indirect demographic consequences of the former-Yugoslavia's disintegration and the war (1991-1995), which in some federal units of the former-Federation, as well as in Serbia, which has fought in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, have established new proportions in the population structure and the demographic development in general. In Serbia, such a situation seems to have a propitious influence on the general size of the population (the arrival of Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia), though the definitive status of the refugees is not known as they do not even fall under the category of "permanent population". On the other hand, the negative effects of the war are more prevailing because of the direct demographic losses (the killing of the Serb youths in the war in the two former-republics, the massive exodus of Serb youths to avoid participation in wars etc) and because of the indirect losses. Researches on these factors and their long-term consequences in Serbia and Serbs would be surely conducted at a later period.

But, the consequences of the disintegration of former-Yugoslavia and of what came after, above all the massive exodus of Albanian youth population, could not pass without producing direct and indirect long-term effects even for Kosova and the Albanians, as well as

for the growth of general population and its structural elements. However, the ceaseless early attempts and commitments of the Serb regimes to defeat the numerical and reproductive domination of the Albanians and establish the ethnic balance in Kosova through the Serbs' colonization, Albanians' expulsion, restriction of births and consequently the weakening of vital-demographic force of the Albanians to various extents and directions up to those genocidal ones, will remain simply a dream of the Serb hegemony. Even historically, the vital-demographic force of the Albanians has been a factor for the preservation of their national existence. Besides the other numerous historical-geographical and political-constitutional arguments, the current demographic reality and moreover the demographic perspective of Kosova and the Albanians, will surely be all-powerful factors of their sovereignty and independence.

Considering the results of the projections and the possibility of realizing them, it is impossible not to face some dilemmas because the success or the failure of these projections depend on a number of factors. In our case, the length of the projections' period is relatively large and over a period of many decades and centuries, unexpected changes may happen in respect to social-economic processes, which represent the main determining factors of the population development trends as well as the influence of other circumstances such as the massive migrations, wars, epidemics and other catastrophes. But, a comparative study between Kosova and Serbia, reveals that all the processes that might hamper the realization of these demographic projections will produce the same effect over these two entities, for example, the migrations and their influence on the general number of the population and its structural peculiarities (according to age, gender, education, profession etc) or any other unexpected circumstance.

**Table 1**. Projection of Kosova and Serbia populations during the period 1981-2016, according to median fertility variant, with migrations(5).

YEAR	KOSOVA (PER 1000 INHABITANTS)	SERBIA (PER 1000 INHABITANTS)	KOSOVA INDEXES 1981=100	SERBIA 2016-1981
1981	1.595	5.701	100,0	100,0
1991	1.953	5.907	122,4	103,6
1996	2.141	5.966	134,2	104,6
2001	2.330	6.001	146,1	105,3
2006	2.505	6.004	157,1	105,3
2011	2.657	5.985	166,6	105,0
2016	2.911	5.957	176,2	104,5

**Table 2**. Projection of Kosova and Serbia populations during the period 1981-2021, according to three fertility variants, without migrations(6).

VARIANT	YEAR	KOSOVA TOTAL (IN THOUSANDS)	SERBIA TOTAL (IN THOUSANDS)
	1981	1.585	5.695
LOW	2001	2.481	5.781
	2021	3.171	5.334
MEDIUM	2001	2.542	5.914
	2021	3.455	5.964
HIGH	2001	2.573	5.964
	2021	3.757	6.043

**Table 3**. Estimation and projection of Kosova and Serbia populations during the period 1991-2150, according to the three fertility variants, without migrations (in thousands)(7).

FERTILITY VARIANT	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
KOSOVA			
1991	1.956	1.956	1.956
2000	2.343	2.363	2.413
2050	3.735	4.469	5.354
2100	3.168	5.147	8.301
2150	2.193	5.113	11.741
ANNUAL POPULATION GROWTH RATE 1991-2150 (ONE PERTHOUSANDS)	0,72	6,06	11,34
SERBIA			
1191	5.809	5.809	5.809
2000	5.817	5.848	5.884
2050	4.212	5.039	6.201
2100	2.359	4.586	8.377
2150	1.434	4.494	12.105
ANNUAL POPULATION GROWTH RATE 1991-2150 (ONE PERTHOUSANDS)	8,76	1,61	4,63

YEAR	KOSOVA		SERBIA	
	MALES FEMALES MALES		MALES	FEMALES
1991	52,19	51,06	21,15	17,71
1996	47,88	47,62	19,13	16,06
2001	43,56	42,19	17,11	14,36
2006	39,25	37,75	15,09	12,69
2001	34,94	33,31	13,06	11,02
2016	30,63	28,87	11,15	10,39

**Table 5.** Average longevity of newborn children in Kosova and Serbia during the period 1991-2016, according to the projections with migrations<sup>9</sup>.

YEAR	KOSOVA		SERBIA	
	MALES	FEMALES	MALES	FEMALES
1991	67.86	72.78	70.00	74.84
1996	68.89	73.65	70.91	75.57
2001	69.92	74.51	71.81	76.31
2006	70.96	75.36	72.74 77.04	
2011	71.98	76.20	73.67	77.77
2016	73.00	77.02	73.18 78.00	

YEAR	TOTAL	ALBANIANS	%	SERBS & MONTEN.	%
1948	733.820	498.242	68,5	199.964	27,5
1961	963.988	646.605	67,1	264.604	27,4
1981	1.584.411	1.226.736	77,4	236.526	14,9
1991	1.956.196	1.596.072	81,6	214.555	11,0
2001	2.400.000	2.041.000	85,0	194.000	8,1
2011	2.900.000	2.540.000	86,6	170.000	5,9
2021	3.360.000	2.295.000	89,1	155.000	4,6
2031	3.800.000	3.425.000	90,1	145.000	3,8
2041	4.180.000	3.795.000	90,8	135.000	3,2
2051	4.500.000	4.105.000	91,2	130.000	2,9

Note: "Total" group (100.0%) is constituted by other elements.

#### Notes:

1 For more see: H. Islami, *The Demographic Reality in Kosova*, Information Center in Kosova, Prishtinë, 1983; *Dimensioni demografik i çështjes së Kosovës*, Enti i Teksteve dhe i Mjeteve Mësimore të Kosovës, Prishtinë, 1997.

2 In demography, this norm implies the gen-

eral number of the live births by a woman over her procreation, which means that in the present circumstances of mortality, the general fertility level of 2.15 children is sufficient for the simple reproduction of population.

3 Lj. Ga esa *Statistiki prilozi*, "Stanovništvo", nr.3-4, CDI, IDN, Beograd 1994, f.210.

4 Group of authors, Naselja u SR Yugoslaviji

sa negativnim ili nultim prirodnim prirastajem u 1991. godini, "Stanovništvo", nr.1-4/1992-1-2/1993, CDI, IDN, Beograd, f.239.

5 G. Penev, *Projekcije stanovnistra Jugoslavije, republika i pokrajina 1981-2016*, Centar za demografska istrazivanja, Institut drustvenih nauka, Beograd 1990 (studim intern).

6 Group of authors, *Projekcije stanovnistva do 2021. godine bez migracija*, in "Demografski problemi i populaciona politika Kosova i Metohije", Univerzitet u Beogradu, CDI, IDN, Beograd 1992, f.227.

7 G. Penev, *Projekcije stanovništva SR Jugoslavije*, 1991-2150. u kontekstu dugoročnih projekcija stanovništva sveta, "Stanovništvo", nr.1-4/1992-1-2/1993, f.79.

8 G. Penev, Projekcije stanovništva

Jugoslavije, republika i pokrajina 1981-2016, CDI, IDN, Beograd, 1990; D.Breznik, Stanovništvo Jugoslavije, "Chronos", Titograd 1991, f.229.

9 G. Penev, idem.; D.Breznik, idem.

10 Source: Popis stanovništva i stanova 1971. Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama, *Statistički bilten 726*, Savezni zavod za statistiku, Beograd 1972, f.7-11 and Popis stanovništva, domačinstava i stanova 1981. Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opstinama, *Statisčki bilten 1295*, Savezni zavod za statistiku, Beograd 1982, f.8-17. As for 1991-2051 projection see: M.Kovacević, *Savesni zavod za statistiku*, Beograd; cituar sipas B. Krstić, *Kosova izmedju istorijskog i etničkog prava*, Kuća Vid, Beograd 1994, f.193.

### THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND KOSOVA

-Political situation in the country after the fascist occupation and the proposed alternatives for Kosova issue-

he fascist occupation brought a difficult situation in Albania. The people and the political forces were to face a big trial. To attain their strategic objectives, the Italian fascist invaders and then the German Nazis elaborated a range of economic, political and military measures. Their efficiency and permanence would considerably depend on the developments in the country, the taking of well-timed measures to avoid any massive resistance of the Albanians on both sides of the border as well as the guarantee, if not of a proper support, at least of a temporary peace, which would enable and allow the exploitation of the rich resources of the country and its strategic location.

For that purpose, the invaders tried to touch the Albanians on a very sensitive issue like the union of their nation, which was unfairly divided by the Ambassadors' Conference in 1913. Under such circumstances, "the plan" of uniting Kosova with Albania was drawn up and performed!

But, this "gift" was bestowed on the Albanians at a fairly high price, asking them to join the Axis and get involved in the fascism's military adventures. In fact, the collaborationist government of Tirana, which, after the union, had authority over Kosova as well, immediately responded to this request, ranking itself among the powers of the fascist Axis. Such an action

surely was perilous and full of repercussions as it directly implicated the government with fascism's crimes.

On the other hand, the act of reuniting Kosova with Albania lacked the proper support and guarantee since only two of the Great Powers, Italy and Germany, had agreed on it. Formally, the other four Great Powers should have given their consent. But, they had already become members of the Anti-fascist Coalition. which was definitely expressed against the changing of borders by force, which was against what the fascist aggressors were actually doing. Through the Atlantic Charter, signed on August 1941, first by England and USA and then by the Soviet Union and other countries, the allied Great Powers, announced the stands and the obligations of the World Anti-fascist Alliance's member countries in the framework of the joint anti-fascist war2.

One important principle of the Atlantic Charter was concerned with the orientation towards not recognizing and disagreeing with the borders' changing, which was done by the Nazifascist invaders by force and mainly for their interests. This was important to be stressed as the national issues like the other problems related to the future of people, would be resolved in the end of the war by their free will and in conformity with the well-known principle of

self-determination3.

There is no doubt that the Kosova issue, placed in the midst of the complex issues and the intertwined interests of the time, was quite delicate. Consequently, the attitudes towards it should be carefully elaborated by considering all the factors, which in a way or another influenced on its solution, including as well the relations with its neighbours and big allies, Albania's promises and obligations, its possibilities and potentiality.

Under such complicated circumstances, the stances of the Albanian political forces towards all the problems that the history offered to the Albanian people, including the Kosova issue, took shape. There is no doubt that the reunity of all Albanian regions into a single nation was cherished by all the political forces irrespective of their ideological views and orientations. But, in such conditions, of prior importance was the finding of a path which would lead to the realization of the national aspirations. The situation in the country and abroad as well dictated the orientation towards the Anti-fascist Coalition, led by three allied Great Powers: England, Soviet Union and USA. Their support undoubtedly would be of special importance to the future of Albania and its post-war position in the European family.

But, the burden of the issue that most concerned the Albanian public opinion was how to win Kosova back and how to correct the inequities made at the Albanians'expense. The fact was that the situation was very complicated because Kosova, since 1913, was part of Yugoslavia, which was also on the Anti-fascist Coalition's side. So, at the end of war, Yugoslavia would be ranked among the winners. From this position and with the right of a victor too, Yugoslavia would try not only to keep control over its earlier annexed territories, such as Kosova, but moreover would extend them at the neighbouring countries' expense. Under such circumstances, the mobilisation side by side with the Axis' powers, as the Tirana government did, would legalize Kosova's annexation and also risk the separation of other parts from the country. For that reason, it was necessary that Albania broke for good with the fascists and the collaborationists and joined the Anti-fascist Coalition. This should have been done not only by Albania towards the 1913 borders issue but Kosova as well. The Kosovars surely should have raised the anti-fascist flag as only in this way they would have the right, after the war, to ask for self-determination on the basis of the Atlantic Charter.

In such circumstances, the only way which would give to the Kosova Albanians the right to put forth their national aspirations and to Albania the chance to support them would be the Albanians' organization, on both sides of the border, in the fight against the Nazi invaders like all the progressive and democratic world was doing. This was understood and carried through by the National-Liberation Movement, which besides the communists, was embraced by many democratic nationalists of various views, orientations and beliefs from all over the country.

But, some of the Albanian nationalists, gathered first in the National Front Organization and later in the Legality Organization, did not consider as fair the road, chosen by the National-Liberation Movement. They believed that the Albanians had possibilities to win their own national and ethnic rights without being involved in war, sparing in this way the war sacrifices. Time proved that such a stance was detrimental to the national interests. Furthermore, the Balli (National Front) and Legality leaders would not stay in the country. The anti-communist hatred led them, after the German Nazi invaded Albania, to take the fatal decision of leaving off the war they had declared even formally against the invaders and encouraging the forces to join them against the National-Liberation Army with the common aim of annihilating the National-Liberation Movement. So, they left the political stage and put the burden of struggle for the solution of the national issue and Kosova issue as well on the National-Liberation Front.

The analysis of Albanian National-Libera-

tion Front attitudes towards the Kosova issue could not be made beyond the afore-said historic reality and the alliances forged during the WWII to face the Italian fascist and German aggressors. There is no doubt that the creation of the world anti-fascist alliance, embraced by countries, people and nations which had already fallen victim of the fascist aggression or risked to, was a great historic event for the future of humanity.

This alliance found the Albanian people and the Albanian National-Liberation Movement already involved in the anti-fascist war and consequently with the moral right to take the deserved place among the democratic and antifascist forces. Within the framework of this alliance and its general orientation, the line and the objectives of the National-Liberation War were defined. On their basis, actions were taken to resolve the numerous sensitive problems that concerned the Albanian society, of course according to their order and importance, the freedom and the independence of the country on the first place in order to open way to the solution of other problems, inherited from history. such as the delicate issue of Kosova

On such a basis, the Kosova platform was a hope and a possibility for the solution of this vital problem to the Albanians, but only if the Great Powers' support and the good understanding with the neighbouring Yugoslavia, with which Albania had created a close political and military alliance, would be assured.

The ideas on the solution of Kosova issue are not found in a sole document. They are elaborated and reflected in the acts, approved by the most important meetings during the war, and in the National-Liberation Movement's press. By respecting rigorously the obligations that derived from the anti-fascist alliance and the recommendations of the Comintern on borders, the Communist Party, as the leading force of the war and the National-Liberation Front, evaded an open declaration on Kosova issue. Consequently, such declarations have not been found neither in the program, approved by the Foundation Meeting of November 8, 1941, nor

in the decisions of some of its important meetings including the Extraordinary Conference, on June 1942 or the Conference I on March 1943

Although concerned for not opening earlier the debates on the delicate issue of Kosova, the Albanian Communist Party (ACP) finally was obliged to express its views for its solution as this issue was vital to Albanian people, moreover in the circumstances when most of the Albanian regions had reunited with Albania. For that reason, this question should not only be avoided for much time and so much the less ignore it. Moreover, this issue should be carefully treated in order that the attitudes be clear enough and devoid of misunderstanding, as well as in conformity with the feelings, will and the legal aspirations of Kosova and Albanian people in general, despite the reaction they might cause to Yugoslavia and other big allies.

For the first time, the ACP stance towards the Kosova issue was expressed in the Peza Conference, where representatives of various nationalist factions took part. The conference agreed to the principle that the Kosova issue should be resolved in the wake of the war in accordance to the principle of self-determination as the Charter of Atlantic prescribed. Meantime, the Albanian National-Liberation General Council would offer the proper boost to the Kosova people in order to get them organized against the invaders and legalize consequently the right for self-determination<sup>4</sup>.

The ACP also declared its stance to Kosova in an article of "Zëri I Popullit" right after the Peza Conference, on occasion of the first publication of "Zëri I Popullit" of Kosova. The article cited: "The voice of Kosova and Metohia (Rrafsh I Dukagjinit) people is a lively tribune of the National-Liberation Movement in Kosmet, of that movement which today organizes the people against the invaders and tomorrow would lead the people towards independence and freedom and give full rights to the people of Kosova and Metohia to self-decide on its fate<sup>5</sup>.

Whereas in Mukje, the meeting between the

National-Liberation Front and the National Front organization, held on August 1943, agreed on the ACP opinion that the Kosova issue would be resolved after the war on the basis of the self-determination principle as the Atlantic Charter defined.

Since the reached agreement was denounced in this meeting by the ACP leadership, the latter was obliged to explain once again its attitude towards Kosova in the Second National-Liberation Conference, which was held one month later, on September 1943.

Among other things, the report of this conference cites as follows: "The issues of Kosova and Cameria will be resolved in conformity with the Atlantic Charter and the principle of nations' self-determination. The biggest guarantee for the triumph of this principle is the war that Kosova and Cameria have done and will do side by side with the Yugoslav and Greek people to destroy the Italian and German fascism and along with it all the imperialistic and chauvinistic tendencies throughout the world and especially in the Balkans.

On the reverse, the Kosova people would fight against that Yugoslavia which would enslave it"

On December 1943, the ACP launched a tract to the Kosova people, which among others cited: "The only way of salvation and fulfilment of your desires is the fight against the invaders side by side with the Yugoslav people, the National-Liberation War which would secure the right of self-determination up to secession".

This public declaration was made while the ACP leadership was not yet concretely and clearly expressed on the future of Kosova and such a stand had caused much concern and disappointment among the popular masses. The fascist invasion and its reactionary forces, in Kosova and Albania, were trying to take advantage of such a situation for separating the people from the National-Liberation Movement. Under such circumstances, especially after the German invasion, difficult times came for the National-Liberation Movement in Kosova. The

German Nazi, hailing themselves as liberators and friends of Albanian people, took a number of demagogic measures. They established the so-called new Albanian administration and appointed a number of Kosova personalities in its bodies, Concretely, the interim Executive Committee, established on September 1943 in Tirana, had six members, two of which, Bedri Pejani and Xhaferr Deva, were from Kosova. Of 243 members of the National Assembly, assembled on October, 150 were from Kosova, while Rexhep Mitrovica from Kosova was appointed leader of the "Albanian government", established in November by the invaders. On September 1943, the "Prizren's League" was founded in Prizren and it enjoyed the support of Hitlerian Germany. In such circumstances, the National-Liberation Movement in Kosova was not having the expected progress. Moreover, a part of population cherished illusions for the "pro-Albanian" policy of the Germans and the program of Ethnic Albania, which was elaborated by the Second League of Prizren. The ACP tract, launched under such circumstances, aimed to explain its policy towards Kosova and on this basis increased the confidence and the support of Kosova people for the National-Liberation Movement.

Finally, the stand of the Albanian National-Liberation Movement towards the Kosova issue would be clearly unveiled in the Congress of Permet, which was held on May 1944. The opening speech of this Congress, held by the Head of the Albanian National-Liberation Antifascist Council, Omar Nishani, stressed that: "If the Kosovars want to win the right on self-determination on the basis of Atlantic Charter..... they should be integrated into the National-Liberation Front and fight the German Nazism. Only by following this path, Kosova, after the war, would have the right to decide on its fate until it secedes"."

But, as in some important meetings of the National-Liberation Movement, held during the years of war, an open attitude was maintained towards Kosova, in communication with the masses, National-Liberation Front structures,

Commands and staff, and especially with the representatives of the allied states and neighbouring countries, much care was shown not to discuss about this issue here and there in order not to cause contradictions with the Yugoslavs. So, in a letter, addressed on September 1943 to Haxhi Lleshi. Commander of Dibra Regional Staff, the National-Liberation War leadership recommended: "For the time being, the borders issue should not be mentioned" as "it is a serious disease, which would be later cured". It also stated that "we are against the fascists' division of Albania and in favour of people's self-determination" 10.

Such an attitude was first conditioned by the circumstances under which the National-Liberation Movement of Albania was obliged to act. This attitude was in conformity with the big allies'requests, embodied in the Atlantic Charter, as well as the line and the spirit of the Anti-fascist Coalition to which the National-Liberation Movement of Albania adhered. There is no doubt that our country's adherence to the anti-fascist coalition, side by side with the big allies and the other people which were against fascism, was a fair and necessary act for the created circumstances. But, such a membership to the Anti-fascist Coalition meant that the National-Liberation Movement was obliged to respect the requests that derived from such an act. But, when it was discussed about the borders issue, these acts left no room to the antifascist coalition's members as this issue was left to be examined and resolved by the end of the war. Consequently, the borders issue could not be considered as a primary and immediate one. Under these conditions, the cooperation of people in their fight against fascism, instead of the territorial claims, came to the fore.

However, even under such circumstances, there have been cases when the declarations to this issue have been openly done by the ANTI-fascist National-Liberation Movement (ANLM), within the possibilities and circumstances. So, an article, published in "Zeri I Popullit" (on March 1943) stated: "Every one knows and none can deny that the overwhelm-

ing majority population in Kosova are Albanians. Shameful injustices have been made at the people's expense"!! Whereas "Bashkimi", an organ of the General National-Liberation Council, on September 1943, highlighted that "It was a big injustice that Kosova, a country with Albanian population, remains out of its natural borders. Such an injustice and others were faced by the imperialist war"!2.

A clear and open declaration was made at the Conference of Bujan, whose decisions were immediately reflected in the ANLM press. In an article of "Zëri i Popullit" on February 1944, after it highlighted the success of the Conference proceedings and its decisions on the solution of national issue, it stressed that: "the enemy and its agents want to represent Kosova with the kaçaks of "Kosova" regiment", but the repressed and heroic Kosova, responds to the enemy and betrayers with the National-Liberation Council by which the union of Kosova and Rrafsh Dukagjinit13 population was realized. Whereas "Bashkimi" on its February 1944 issue, has given an extensive place to the Resolution, approved at Bujan Conference. In a comment about it, it was said that "the real Kosova. the Kosova of Isa Boletini, Bajram Curri, Asim Vokshi, Emin Duraku, etc 14 was represented at the Bujan Conference.

However, the restrictions to the treatment of the national issue and in this framework the hesitation to openly declare the objectives, are obvious and they can not be denied. Moreover, it should be stressed that such a stance was not only a result of the Charter of Atlantic's influence and generally speaking of the allied countries' requests but of other factors as well. Among them, it can be highlighted the closer contacts with the Yugoslavs, the hopes and illusions that were raised out of the many declarations of the Yugoslav Communist Party leaders on the people's self-determination right and in this framework, their promises that this right would be given even to the Kosova Albanians, their confidence in this way, common communist and internationalist aims and ideals, which at that time were perceived as naive to a certain extent believing that on their basis, everything, including even the delicate issue of the borders, would be resolved by justice, not to mention then the pressures and influences of those Yugoslav representatives who had come to Albania and other pro-Yugoslav elements in the ranks of the Communist Party of Albania. These factors surely have influenced on the elaborating of the attitudes towards the Kosova issue.

The hesitation to announce and propagate the objectives on the national issue, the reuniting of the ethnic regions into a single state, was related with the fact that every opinion or act, which was taken in support of Kosova's reuniting with Albania, has been faced with the Yugoslavs' counter-action and fury. Under such circumstances, it was done the best to avoid the discussions and confrontations about this delicate issue, which could spoil the relations between the two respective liberation movements on which would benefit the invaders. The Yugoslavs, on their part, as the documents prove, have been much concerned, and through their representatives in Albania, have tried to obviously influence on the Communist Party of Albania, making it to adapt such an attitude that made the Albanians' national issue not to appear so pressing in Yugoslavia. In a letter of Koço Tashko, a personality with much authority in the National-Liberation Movement, addressed on October 1942 to Comintern, it was stressed that such an attitude, the silence to the Kosova issue at its most, has been imposed on the Communist Party of Albania by the representative of the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP) in ALBANIA, Miladin Popovic, who has insisted on the view that "This problem should be resolved by the YCP Central Committee and we have no reason to interfere", because "the Comintern has decided that the Kosova issue would be resolved by the Democratic Yugoslavia and the Democratic Albania" and that "it is better for Kosova to stay under the YCP leadership because Yugoslavia would be liberated earlier than Albania"15.

Our archival document show that Popoviç has later changed position. Being in continuos

contact with the Albanian leaders and seeing closely the reality in Albania and Kosova as well as the reactions towards the Kosova issue, he finally understood and took the plunge to propose to the Yugoslav leadership that it would be to the benefit of our common fight and Albanians' mobilisation for it, that the Kosova National-Liberation Army Staff be commanded by the Albanian General National-Liberation Staff. and Metohija (Rrafsh I Dukagjinit) collaborate with the Albanian party structures. Miladin Popovic also asked the YCP to be expressed concretely and clearly in favour of the selfdetermination right of the Albanians as this was directly related with their mobilisation in the National-Liberation War. Meantime, he suggested that the Kosova issue should be treated similarly with that of Istria, which was ceded to Italy in 1919, while the YCP insisted that Isria should be given back to Yugoslavia since it was inhabited by a majority of Slav population 16.

But, the high Yugoslav leadership did not welcome Popoviç's proposals. In a letter that J.B Tito addressed to the Albanian Communist Party (ACP) Central Committee and Popoviç, it was stated as follows: Comrade Millo (the nickname for M.Popovi... - Xh.Gj.) is not right when he says that our Party should declare its stance towards the issues of Kosova and Metohija and moreover when he makes a comparison of these two regions with Istria. To put forth the issue of Kosova's reuniting with Albania, in the present circumstances, means to serve to the various reactionary elements and the invaders, who want to hamper the armed war"<sup>17</sup>.

Despite the dominant factors, it was unavoidable for the policy of the ACP and the National-Liberation Front not to create problems. Due to this policy, the Albanians, at the beginning of the war, were too reserved towards the policy of the National-Liberation Movement as well as insecure and worried about the future of Kosova by the end of the war as this aspect (Kosova's future) was closely related to the support of Albania and its political forces. Above all, they wanted to see such a support in

the political attitudes of the National-Liberation Movement, as the most authoritative and organized force in the country. The adversary forces, ranging from the collaborationist government to the various political groupings, tried to make use of such a confused situation, as Tashko highlighted. They aimed to appear as the only forces in the country, which were interested in the Kosova issue and for that reason they had taken the initiative, whereas the National-Liberation Movement, according to them, hampered and sabotaged the solution of Kosova issue for the sake of its friendship with the Slavs. This card was used by them in an effort to create confusion and disappointment among the masses and consequently to distract their attention from the National-Liberation War.

To avoid and recompense the consequences of such a policy, the ACP and the Albanian National-Liberation Movement tried to find and make use of other possibilities and ways

to enter Kosova and extend their influence there. At the consent of the Yugoslav side as well, a number of distinguished elements and activists of the Albanian National-Liberation Movement, mainly from Kosova but other regions of Albania, too, were sent to Kosova since the start of the war. Besides their contribution to organize the war in the Albanianinhabited areas, these elements tried to explain and disseminate the Albanian National-Liberation Movement policy to Kosova. Later on, larger units of the Albanian National-Liberation Army were dispatched to Kosova to help our brothers in the fight against the Nazi-fascist aggressors and their collaborators. By following this way, it was believed that the weight and the role of Albania and its people towards the Anti-fascist War and the Anti-fascist Coalition would be increased while the Albanians' national requests and rights would be legitimized and supported by the allies.

#### Notes:

- 1 "Fletore zyrtare", no. 29 August 29, 1941; A. Hadri, *Lëvi-ja Nacionalçlirimtare në Kosovë*, 1941-1945, "Rilindja", Prishtinë, 1971, f.97-98.
- 2 Histoire diplomatique de 1919 à USS Jours, Paris, 1981, pg.306; R. Batalia, Lufta e Dyte Botërore, Tiranë, 1991, f.194.
- 3 *Idem*; L. Nasi, *Problemi i Kosovës në fund të Luftës së Dytë Botërore*, "Dardania", no.6, February 1992, pg.5.
- 4 Arkivi Qendror i Shtetit (më tej: AQSH), Fondi 14, Procesverbal i Konferences së Pezës, 1942.
- 5 Arkivi i Institutit të Historisë (më tej:AIH),"Zëri i Popullit", no. 3-4, October 1942.
- 6 AQSH, Fondi 14 i KQ të PKSH. Procesverbal i Mbledhjes së Mukjes, 1 gusht 1943.
  - 7 Idem. Fondi 14 i KQ të PKSh. Documents

- of the Second National-Liberation Conference, September 4-9, 1943.
- 8 *Idem*; Fondi 14 I KQ të PKSH. Trakt i PKSH, dhjetor 1943.
- 9 *Idem*; Fondi 40, dos.12. Procesverbal i Kongresit I Antifashist.
- 10 E. Hoxha, *Vepra*, vol.I, Tiranë, 1983, f. 502.
- 11 "Zeri i Popullit" and its bulletins, 1942-1944, Tirana, 1986, pg.361.
  - 12 AIH, "Bashkimi", no.4, September 1943.
- 13 *Idem*, "Zëri i Popullit", viti III, no. 33, February 7, 1944.
  - 14 Idem, "Bashkimi", no. 5, February 1944.
- 15 AQSH, Fondi 14 i KQ të PKSH. Letter of K. Tashko to Comintern, October 1942.
- 16 *Idem*, Fondi 14 i KQ të PKSH. The letter to the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP) Central Committee, July 29, 1943.
- 17 *Idem*, Letter of J.B. Tito, December 6, 1943.

# "REVIEW OF AGRARIAN REFORM" IN KOSOVA (1945-1947)

fter the Second World War, the so-called Review of agrarian reform in Kosova took place at the time when the Yugoslav leadership was trying to find its own place in the Yugoslav Federation. The region was overrun by a large number of Yugoslav military units, whose presence was accompanied by a fierce genocidal campaign and a whole host of accusations against the Albanian people. Although the Albanians, among other people, have greatly contributed and shed very much blood in fighting fascism, they were deemed by the Serb and Yugoslav leaderships as being collaborators of the invaders as well as doubtful and pernicious to the existence of the Yugoslav state.

To better comprehend the agrarian policy during 1945-1947, it is of interest to describe in outline the objectives and the results of the agrarian reform, applied in Kosova before the Second World War. The reform period of the 1920s to 1940s turned out to be one of the cruellest ever carried out by the Serb monarchy with the aim of denationalising the Albanian regions. It badly hit and expropriated all the Albanian population strata. Furthermore, this reform aimed at creating an incessant emigration wave of the Albanians towards Turkey as well as free up land for the Slav colonization of these regions. Data of the High Agrarian Reform De-

partment with its centre in Skopje, show that, until the end of 1940, a total of 280,000 ha of land were accumulated by the colonization land area in the Albanian regions in Yugoslavia and of those 192,212 ha were in Kosova. About 13,393 families of Serb and Montegrin colonists comprisong some 60,000 people were settled in the region, while thousands of others settled in the urban areas!

Political parties and various personalities of the pre-war Yugoslavia have treated the issues of Albanians' expropriation and displacement as well as the Slav colonisation of these regions as an inseparable matter. Gj. Krstif, chief of the High Agrarian Reform Department, which supervised the application of the "agrarian reform", insisted on stepping up the colonisation process. He also asked this process be wellplanned and financed by the state administration. Krstif attached very great importance to the selection of the colonies and the formation of durable and purpose-built 2 settlements. The projects to denationalise the Albanian regions were best reflected in the so-called "Serb Culture Club", established in Belgrade in 1936, and synthesized in the report of Vasa ,ubrillovif, "Arnauts' Expulsion", which served as a platform for the further anti-Albanian actions of the Serb regime.

After the Second World War, the discontent of the Albanians in Kosova and in other regions with the pre-war colonizing agrarian reform and the injustices made at their expense, propelled the post-war Yugoslav state towards taking immediate measures for arranging the agrarian relations. The solution of the land ownership issue was a very important question, dictated even by the population structure.

At that time, the Yugoslav government leaders agreed in principle that the land re-distribution process would point at giving to the villagers enough land for establishing a subsistence economy. They maintained that the agrarian problem would be resolved by dividing abudantly free land between the peasants who had a little or no land at all. All those who had served the invaders were not likely to benefit while the colonists, who had taken land before the war by expelling the autonomous villagers from their lands, would be compensated with land somewhere else4. According to the Minister of Colonization, S. Vukosavlevi..., the conditions and the means to achieve this already existed. In the regions of Vojvodina, Banat, Backa and Srem, there were about 380,000 ha of land left by the Germans after the war. Free land also stretched out between Përnjavor, Banja-Luka and Bjelina<sup>5</sup>. But, the Yugoslav government clarified that it did not intend to take away the land to those peasants who possessed it before the war and still less from the Serb colonists in Kosova and Macedonia, though in their case adaptations might be made. The aim of the government was to re-settle the colonists there and if they would not receive enough land, they could move to other regions6.

The arrangement of the land ownership relations in Kosova and other Albanian regions required meeting the needs for land, primarily by the Albanian people who had lived there historically. On April 1945, representatives of the Albanian people submitted this request to J.B. Tito stressing that "it is fair that we, who have lived here, be the first to receive land since we have inherited it from our fathers and forefathers". But, the central state bodies considered

such requests as attempts of the Albanian reaction, which even towards "the land issue" aimed at instigating national inequality and contradictions between the people and chauvinisms.

The Ministriy of Colonization and Agriculture led by V. Çubrilloviç was charged with the process of reviewing the Agrarian Reform, even led by by V. Çubrilloviç. Not long before taking this post, on November 3, 1944, V. Çubrilloviç reported to the highest Yugoslav leadership officials on the displacement of the national minorities from Yugoslavia. His report was similar to the one he had drawn up before the war in respect to intentions, means, and the ways proposed to displace national minorities from Yugoslavia including the Albanians, as well as the systematic and planned colonization of the Slav population.

Facts show that the review of the Agrarian Reform in Kosova and other Albanian regions was closely related to the Slav re-colonization of those regions. In this context, we can mention that Kosova lacked "extra land" while the density of the agrarian population, inherited from the pre-war period, was higher than in the other regions of Yugoslavia. So, 100 ha (of land) belonged to 97 inhabitants in Slovenia, 117.5 in Croatia, 126.5 in Serbia, 66.5 in Vojvodina and 183 in Kosova<sup>9</sup>. Thus, approximately 1.5 ha (of land) belonged to each Vojvodina inhabitant but only 0.5 ha to each Kosovar<sup>10</sup>. The postwar economic situation of the Albanian peasantry worsened because of the taxes levied to pay for 40,000 armed troops operating in these regions11. Besides, the Albanian population was coerced into furnishing with food and other necessary supplies the colonists' families, who started to return to Kosova after being liberated from the German invaders. The First Congress of the Serb Communist Party, held on May 1945, revealed that the local bodies had bidden all the Serb and Montenegrin colonists to settle back in Kosova on the land they had obtained in the past from the Agrarian Reform<sup>12</sup>. During that time, "local agrarian commissions" were established, their duty being to decide on various land-ownership-related problems. They acted upon the instructions from the political

and military bodies operating in the region. The massive return of the colonists, especially by the end of 1944 and the start of 1945, triggered much discontent among the Albanian peasants as the "Montegrins were grabbing from them the land that had been previously stolen by the regime of King Peter" and moreover the colonists demanded from the peasants agricultural tax for the past five years.

The land ownership review law was decreed in Macedonia and Kosova on August 3, 1945, when an overwhelming majority of the colonists had already been resettled in the region. In principle, the law prescribed that the colonists lost the right to their previous properties if they were presently settled on the land of the private landowners or the former Albanian political emigrants (outlaws), or if they were not farmers but had received land in reward for the services they had made to the regime as gendarms or financial employees, and lastly on the provision that they were tenants. The law excluded from the land ownership rights all the colonists who had been distinctly hostile during the National-Liberation War. It also defined that the colonists, settled in Macedonia before the war and who also had lost the rights on land ownership would be compensated with land in other regions of Yugoslavia while in Kosova they would re-take land within the territory of the region<sup>18</sup>. So, it is clear that though the law on reviewing the agrarian reform was intended to serve the colonisation problem, the way it was applied was different in Kosova compared to Macedonia.

To oversee the "Agrarian Reform Review" law in Kosova, a special supervisory commission with representatives from the Ministries of Colonization and Agriculture and Kosova district council was set up. The Prizren-based commission ordered all the colonists in Kosova to settle back in their areas as this action would be then indispensable for debating and resolving all the moot issues<sup>16</sup>. In the meantime, the Ministry of Colonization rejected the commission's proposal according to which the colonists, who had long been settled in Vojvodina had no right to return to Kosova.

The Ministry reckoned that all the colonists should first wait until the decisions be approved since the law could confiscate or restrict the land of the colonists or other agrarian farmers. On the other hand, the confiscated or the confined land would be used for the colonization process. The colonists in possession of land surfaces, smaller than the law suggested, would be the first to be compesated while the remaining land would be given to the Albanians or the Serbs in need of land. The commission had the right to cancel all the previous decisions on land ownership-related problems. On the other hand, it was fully authorized to settle all the arguable cases. The commission had to cooperate with a representative of the colonists whose duty was to feed with to the commission with all necessary information about the issues under discussion 18. In practice, the commission's motto was to leave in Kosova and Rrafsh i Dukagjinit as many colonists (who had lived in the region beforehand) as possible. To reach that goal, many abuses were made, especially by that category of colonists who were expected to lose the right to land ownership. In general, the lands, stolen by them during the pre-war period appear to have been procured from the legal land sales, while the colonists' representative in the commission had to present "evidences" for those colonists, who had no land at all. On the other hand, the Albanian landowners, who before the war had been obliged to leave their land, were considered as collaborators of the invaders.

Any decision in favour of the Albanian peasants by the local agrarian commissions was considered as invalid under the pretext of being influenced by the Albanian environment and elements, who had served collaborators in the past.

The commission member, representative of the Slav colonists, or the colonists directly affected by the review of agrarian reform, used to report to the commission about the political attitudes of the Albanian or Serb landowners. These stances were in conformity with the decisions of the Ministry of Colonization, which did not recognize the land sales carried out during the fascist invasion, considering them as

"land sales made under threat and force". On the other hand, it regarded as quite legitimate all land purchases, realized by the Slav colonies before the war. According to this Ministry, "the colonists had obtained these lands quite legally and by no means under pressure. But, even if pressure might have been exerted, this can be said only for some specific cases that have not influenced at all the land sales".

The policy towards the "Agrarian Reform Review" process led to the re-distribution of the land set aside for the colonization process to the "poor colonists", or "to those colonists who used to live alone in various Albanian regions". They allegedly "possessed only barren lands on which they could not live with their own families"20. Until the autumn of 1946, the Central Commission on Agrarian Reform Review, established at the order of the Ministry of Colonization close to the government of the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, had resolved a total of 3,242 cases of agrarian conflicts. Based on its decisions, the commission gave to 1,686 colonists' families the right to land ownership, while-1,258 others received it partially. 297 lost this right. Out of this process, 1,634 colonists' families and 266 Albanians got land21. Became some of the colonists' families had not yet returned to Kosova, a meeting of the Executive District Council, held on October 1946, appealed to them to return to the region within the next four months22.

This was also the objective of a meeting of the Reform and Colonization Department, organized on March 6, 1946, in Belgrade. The meeting decided that all the colonists from Kaçaniku, Gjilan, Nerodimja, Graçanica, Llapi, Vuçiterna and Mitrovica, i.e. from Fushe-Kosova, should return immediately to the region. Likewise the colonists from Peja, Gjakova, Drenica, Istog, Sharri and Podrima, whose right on land-ownership was fully or partially recognized, should also resettle. Those partially affected would be compesated with land from the colonization land fund<sup>23</sup>.

The colonial system in Kosova was greatly supported by the central and local bodies. Transport of the colonists from the other regions of

Yugoslavia to Peja, Podujeva and Kaçanik and then to their lands was gratis. The Albanian peasants consented to shelter the colonists, whose houses had been destroyed<sup>24</sup>. They also were charged with the building of new houses for the colonists.

A total of 2,145 houses were constructed and 2,790 others repaired, while 836 others, said to meet 50 percent of the colonists' demands, were also under construction<sup>25</sup>.

During this period, the colonists were assisted with various construction materials including bricks, roof-tiles, glass etc.

Referring to the District Council data, up to March of 1947, the total fund for the construction or repairs of the houses amounted to 83,394,500 dinars<sup>20</sup>. The work, carried out by the Albanian peasants, was double in value to that of the state expenses.

Abundant quantities of cereals, cow and sheep milk, soap, grease, potatoes as well as money were collected for the families of those colonists, who were "badly affected by the war" as a result of the requisition orders. This aid was offered to 50,000 people<sup>27</sup>. In 1945, the Serbian government accorded 15,000,000 dinars for buying seeds from the colonists<sup>28</sup> and 34,000,000 dinars for the consolidation of their economy20. With this credit, the colonists bought 1,952 breed cows, 5,506 sheep, 494 pairs of oxen etc, not to mention the herds of cattle they received from the requisitions or the trials. Moreover, the local bodies had charged the district councils with the mobilization of the Albanian population into tilling and ploughing the lands of the colonists.

Final conclusions of the so-called "review of agrarian reform" in Kosova showed that: only 15,000 ha of land<sup>31</sup> were returned to Albanian families during the "review of agrarian reform" at a time when before the war, about 192,212 ha of land had been used for the agrarian reform to help the colonization process. This fact clearly shows the exact character of the "revision of agrarian reform" and that this "review" was part of the policy followed after the war towards the albanian people in all fields. 1947

data from the Executive District Council showed that, in Kosova various commissions in charge of "agrarian reform revision" recognized the land ownership rights of 4,829 colonist families and partially of only 5,744. While 595 others lost the right<sup>32</sup>.

On the whole, it can be said that the policy of "revision of agrarian reform" was a continu-

ation of the Serb platform to denationalise the Albanian population and the colonization of these reasons Slavs. The process was based on the aims of Serb circles to hit the economic position of the Albanian peasantry and strengthen that of the Slav colonists, who would constitute the main pillar of the political power in these regions.

#### Notes:

1 A. Hadri, Gjakova prej themelimit deri në vitin 1941, in "Kosova", no.1, Prishtinë, 1972, f.426; Mitrovica dhe rrethina, Mitrovicë, 1979, f.124; M. Verli, Reforma Agrare kolonizuese në Kosovë në vitet 20-30 dhe karakteri i saj antishqiptar, f.229, (Defended dissertation) Arkivi i Institutit të Historisë (më tej: AIH), dos. A-V-216.

2 For further information see: Gj. Krstić, *Kolonizacija Južnoj Srbije*, Sarajevo, 1928.

- 3 For further information see: V. Cubrillović, *Iseljavanje arnauta*, 7 March, 1937.
- 4 M.Pijade, Para reformës agrare, in "Rilindja", 5 May 1945.
  - 5 "Rilindja", 2 June 1989.
  - 6 Idem
- 7 Delegacioni i shqiptarëve të Kosovës visiton mareshalin Tito, in "Rilindja", 15 April, 1945.
- 8 Këshilli populluer i Krahinës autonome të Kosovë-Metohisë (1943-1953), Prishtinë, 1955, f.36. A report on political situation, on 10th July 1945.
- 9 H.Bajramı, Rrethanat shoqërore dhe politike në Kosovë në vitet (1918-1941), Prishtinë, 1981, f.24.
  - 10 Këshilli populluer...., f.575.
- 11 V.Dedijer, *Novi prilozi za biografiju J.B. Tita*, vol.2, Rijeka, 1981, pg.909.
- 12 Osnivački Kongres KPS, Belgrad 1972, pg.83.
- 13. Arkivi Qendror i Ushtrisë i RSH (me tej: AQU), Fondi Brigada e 3-të, viti 1945, kut.2, dos.32, fl.1.
- 14 *Idem*, Fondi Brigada e 22-të, viti 1944-1945, kut.1, dos.16, f.65.
  - 15 Ligji mbi rishikimin e Reformës Agrare

*në Kosovë e në Maqedoni*, in "Flaka e vllaznimit", August 10, 1946.

16 Këshilli populluer....., f.104. Report on Executive District Council, June 16, 1946.

17 M.Obradović, *Revizija agrarna reforma na Kosovu*, in "Kosova", no.3, Prishtina, 1974, pg.392.

- 18 Idem.pg.397.
- 19 Idem. pg.403.
- 20 Ndreqja e padrejtësive të vjetra agrare në Kosovë, in "Rilindja", July 28, 1946, pg.1.
- 21 Këshilli populluer..., f.130. Report on the Provincial Executive Council, October 13-14, 1946
  - 22 Idem.
  - 23 M. Obradović, op.cit., f.404.
- 24 Urdhër i Këshillit Krahinor..., in "Rilindja", January 6,1946, pg.5.
  - 25 Idem.
- 26 Këshilli Populluer...f.164. Report on the Provincial Executive Council activity in the fifth session of the Legislature I, March 12-13, 1947.
- 27 Këshilli Populluer..., f.28. Report of the Executive District Councils activity in the first session of Legislature I, Prizren, July 8-10, 1945.
- 28 *Idem.* pg.64. Report on the Regional Executive Councils activity in the second session of the Legislature II of Provincial People's Council, December 30, 1945.
- 29 *Idem.* pg.157. Report on the Provincial Executive Council activity in the fifth session of the Legislature I.
  - 30 Idem. pg.164.
- 31 Mbledhja III e Asamblesë së Këshillit popullor krahinor për Kosmetin, "Rilindja", 27 qershor 1946.
- 32 *Këshilli populluer* .., f.162. Report on the Provincial Executive Council..., March 12-13, 1942.

## "GARAŠANIN'S NAČERTANIJE - IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF GREATER SERBIA'S PROGRAM

n the history of the southern Slavs over the last two centuries, the national problem has been probably more apparent than many others. Despite the attempts to bring unity among them, which was greatly induced by the favourable international conjunctures, and materialized over 1918-1991 period, as a result of which the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom (called Kingdom of Yugoslavia during 1929-1941) first and then the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia were established, the southern Slavs failed to overcome the main contradictions. The consequences were obvious. Yugoslavia fell apart twice, respectively in 1941 and 1991. Moreover, the second time it happened, disintegration did not ensue from the foreign military attacks but from the finalisation of the centrifugal inclinations that various people demonstrated under specific international circumstances. Actually, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia have been separated from the former-Federation, while Yugoslavia is restricted only to Serbia and Montenegro as well as Kosova, which is kept occupied. Among the regions of various southern Slav countries, nationalism does not simply pose a political issue. It has taken economic, religious, cultural and ideologic forms too. However, one

thing should be stressed: the solution of national problems, in principle, has always emerged in two forms; centralism and federalism as well as confederacy, which appeared over the last period prior to the disintegration of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. The borderline between these two forms is surely hard to define. It is like the colours of a spectrum, which show even vague shades. Likewise, the theories and practical application of the issue in question has been interpreted in various forms.

The Serbs, based on their historical tradition, which dates to medieval period, and more often on..the XIX literary-artistic creations formed over the last century with evident distortion of the historic reality, have always been partisans of centralism. According to the Serb concept, Belgrade has the right to decide on the fate of each state and nation, which had relations with the Serbs or would start having links with them. On the contrary, the opposite of centralism, federalism, was inculcated in the Croats' history. The consolidation of this view without doubt was affected by the period of Austrian invasion, which especially during the 19 century, reflected a tendency for a political and administrative decentralisation of the Habsburg Empire. The Croat concept,

which would be later supported even by the Slovenes, required the founding of an united Yugoslav state, whose integral parts, in accordance with the national and regional circumstances, would be the political equality and the autonomy. The representatives of this faction, Strossmajer, Raçki, and later Stupillo, Trumbiq etc. judged at the beginning that the Bulgarians too should be part of the common state with the Scrbs, Croats and Slovenes<sup>1</sup>.

So, the southern Slavs, especially their social-economic and political elite, which hoped for a common state, were faced with two principles. One of them, i.e. the Serb version included the view of Ilia Garašanin, reflected in "Naçertanije of 1844, which was considered the first detailed political platform of Belgrade's leading circles as well as the ideological basis of Greater Serbia's chauvinist program<sup>2</sup>. There is much more to say of "Naçertanije" considering that even to date it still remains the basis of the chauvinist program of our northern neighbour, whose yoke keeps opposed about 2m Albanians, who are autonomous inhabitants on their regions.

It should be stressed that the "Nacertanije" ideas were first presented as a confidential collection of I. Garašanin, which later took the form of a fundamental program for the organization of a great Serb state. In 1844, when he introduced this platform to his anti-Russian Prince, Aleksandar Karadjordjevic, Ilia Garašanin had the post of the Serb Minister of the Interior. Probably, at that time, it could not be spoken of a state document in the proper sense of the word. But, even after 1. Garašanin became Premier "Naçertanije" was legitimatized, the latter was not made public because of its expansionist character. Moreover, it is believed that the first foreign government, the government of Vienna, which was made known with "Naçertanije", obtained a copy of it not earlier than 1883. Whereas the wide public opinion was informed of "Nacertanije" only in 1906, when the magazine of Belgrade <sup>3</sup> "Dello published it".

Since the time it saw the light of day, "Naçertanije" has been subject to discussions and debates among historians. The Serbs have treated it as one of the projects on which the Yugoslav state might have been established. Whereas to Slovene, Croat and Albanian historians, "Naçertanije" has been a chauvinist program whose aim was to incorporate all the territories of Southern Slavs and other regions of neighbouring countries into an unitary Greater Serbia. Questions related to Garašanin's alternatives or the state of southern Slavs he aimed to found can take answers after having a look at his program, starting from its origins.

After the defeat of Polish liberation revolution in 1830, the former-Russian-Polish Foreign Minister (during the period 1801-1806), Adam Czartoryski and his collaborators stepped their efforts to make a coalition of the suppressed Slav countries, which would be then set against the invading Russia and Austria. Representatives of the Polish national movement hoped that the Balkans' southern Slav countries would be of support to them to conquer the Russians and the Austrians and revive the independent and united Poland. For that purpose, A. Czartoryski drafted a program in 1843, which focused on the development of internal and external policy of Serbia, as the only Slav country in the Balkans, with the aim using its autonomy for the realisation of a cooperation between the southern Slavs. A. Czartoryski discussed his program with the Czech, Frantishek Zach, who was sent to Belgrade as a representative of the Polish, During 1843, F. Zach often met with I. Garašanin and they might have talked about the role that Serbia would play in the future in the Balkans and further. At the Serb Minister's proposal or at his own initiative, Zach, in the first half of 1844, drew up a plan, which he introduced to I. Garašanin. Based on this plan, 1. Garašanin drafted "Naçertanije". Almost 90 percent of "Nacertanije" has been copied word by word from Zach's plan. While only some parts of this plan or one thirds of its text (about

30 pages) have been omitted by I. Garašanin6.

Garašanin's platform treated three main subjects: Serbia's political aim, its policy towards Russia and Austria and lastly Serbia's stance towards Balkans' Slavs.

Since at the very beginning, the author underlined that it was the high time for Serbia to pinpoint its aim for the future as well as to start working to achievie it. He considered as main objective the fulfilment of recommendations of Tsar Stefan Dušan, the attempts for the accomplishment of which were interrupted by the Battle of Kosova in 1389. This way, the Serb Empire's re-establishment was perceived as an historical right and consequently the rulers of XIX century Serbia had the right to realize what their predecessors had not done. According to Garašanin, this would be "a sacred historical right" and not "a subversive revolutionary work".

"Naçertanije" also stated that the success of Serbia's mission would depend not only on Serbia's attempts but on Russia' and Austria's stances and especially on their reaction to the Ottoman Empire. However, the interests of these two countries in the Balkans, especially of Austria's, were viewed as contradictory to those of Serbia and it was said that the foreign aid should have been expected from France and England as these two countries, among the Great Powers, might have been really interested in the establishment of a new Christian empire in the Balkans, which would hamper the further expansion of Austria and Russia.

"Naçertanije" also prescribed that the success of Serbia's policy would depend on the commitment that other Slavs of the Balkans would show to join its policy and in this framework it was recommended that before starting to apply the program, Belgrade should first obtain political information about its neighbouring countries. For that reason, I. Garašanin recommended in its program to send trustworthy observers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Northern Albania\*, Slavonia, Croatia, Dalmatia, Srem,

Backë and Banat. Their duty would be to prepare secret reports about these countries, focusing mainly on the relations between the political groupings, specifying Serbia's friends and foes and even the political aims of specific countries and possibly the place they gave to Serbia's role on their political programs. Belgrade's agents were also charged with finding information about the military potentiality of these countries, their strategic locations, kinds and amount of munitions etc. The agents'instruction about what they should say about Serbia's aims were considered of much importance. "Nacertanije" stated that Serbia could start realising its national plan 8 only after gathering a general information about its neighouring countries.

Almost one fourth of "Naçertanije" was concerned with the relations with the Bulgarians. According to I.Garašanin, Bulgaria, though with a population size larger than the other suppressed southern Slavs mainly because of the prolonged Turkish slavery, was turned into a humble and insecure people. Russia's support was the only salvation to Bulgaria and as long as Serbia would not be on good terms with Petersburg "because of refusing to be used as a blind tool" by the Bulgarians, much care should be shown to avoid an anti-Serb reaction on their part. Referring to I.Garašanin, the danger of an anti-Serb bastion in Bulgaria made less possible the realization of a cooperation between Serbia and Bulgaria or Serbia and Russia though the same anti-Ottoman orientation existed. To lessen this risk to the maximum, "Nacertanije" put forth many proposals especially with reference to the spiritual sphere. They particularly aimed to develop the Bulgarians' sympathy for Serbia. But, the impression was that the idea of a co-existence between the two countries would be considered until the Serb influence would not prevail over the Russian one, which was quite great on the Bulgarians. Such a phenomenon probably was considered as dangerous for the Serb supremacy9.

After expressing his doubt about a sincere

relation between Russia and Serbia for the former's global interests and accordingly about Serbia's steps towards Bulgaria with the aim favouring its interests, I. Garašanin projects the Serb policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Albania into the main part of "Nacertanije" (about two fifth of it). In his view, these were the countries towards which "Serbia could have a greater influence" and much success. For these countries and Croatia possibly, some economic, political, religious and education measures were planned to be applied with the aim to prepare the ground for the establishment of Serb rule as the union should be realised only under Serb dynasty10.

On the other hand, "Naçertanije" treated the measures that were necessary to be taken for destroying Austria's commercial monopoly in Serbia. The penetration into the Adriatic Sea and Albanian shores of Ulgin via Shkodra was considered a necessity. This would establish direct trade relations with Europe and make possible the assimilation of profitable advantageous methods by the Slavs of Dalmatia. The trade agent in Ulqin, who was authorized to follow this economic activity, was also instructed to exert a political influence on Montenegro and Northern Albania as these two nations "had the key to open the doors of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Adriatic Sea as well". According to I. Garašanin, annual subventions should have been given to these countries in order to win their authorities' and elites' support. Not only friendship ensued from these grants but even the military support in case of war especially from the Montenegrins, where an annual subvention for the people guaranteed the mobilisation of 10.000 armed highlanders in case of

Sparing details about the steps taken to realise these ideas, much stress should be put on the attempts of Belgrade's leading circles throughout the period between the second half of XIX C and XX C to put the Albanian leaders of Kosova and other western Albanian re-

gions or Albanian political personalities at their service or at least to adapt them to Serbia's interests. The political leaders Ristiq and Pashiq, Zogolli family from Mat, various highland chieftains mainly from Mirdita as well as Ismail Qemal, Esat Toptani, Ahmet Zog etc. became the reference points of this activity. The later reports, mainly those prepared around 1930 by Ivan Vukotiq and Ivo Andriq, confirmed that, despite its results, this activity has been quite intensive and with incalculable harm to Albanian nation.

With the occupation of Sandjak of Nish in 1878 and later of Kosova in 1912 etc., the leading circles of Belgrade progressed much in realising the ideas of "Naçertanije" by institutionalising a policy of ethnic cleansing with the aim of denationalizing the Albanian regions and realize a Slav colonisation. The Albanians were terrorized and collectively expropriated and displaced, while the other regions were colonized by thousands of Serb and Montenegrin families<sup>12</sup>.

"Naçertanije" gave attention even to the Serbs-populated regions of Sava and Danub, including Srem, Baçka and Banat, over which the Austrian influence had to be neutralised. Lastly, I. Garašanin spoke in this first detailed Serb platform-political program about the necessity of building a greater mutual confidence between the Serbs, Czechs and Slovenes<sup>13</sup>.

These were the fundamental principles of "Naçertanije" but as we mentioned above, its real essence becomes clearer if viewed in respect to what I.Garašanin picked up from Zach's plan, which widely used the term "southern Slav". While I. Garašanin has regularly substituted this term with the word "Serb", Zach opened his plan with the fact that Serbia could be greater and achieve its goals only in collaboration with "the Southern Slavs", while I. Garašanin substituted this term with the word "neighouring countries". The plan also stated that the fundamental principle of Serb policy should be "southern Slavrelated", whereas I.Garašanin maintained that Serbia "should try to win the support of Serbia's neigbours". I. Garašanin has omitted all that part of Zach's plan which defines as its main purpose the development of a policy "in confirmity with the southern-Slav policy of Serbia". F. Zach considered Austria "as the enemy of the southern-Slav state" while to 1. Garašanin, Austria was "an enemy of Serb state". According to F. Zach, Serbia should have been the nucleus of "the future Yugoslav empire" while in Garašanin's view, the core of "the Serb empire" "which dated to the XIII-XIV centuries' Serb empire as well as to the rich and glorious history of Serbia<sup>14</sup> Such comparisons are sufficient to draw the conclusion that I. Garašanin had a way of thinking of a Serb chauvinist and not of a Yugoslav liberator.

"Naçertanije" made no mention of Croat issue. I. Garašanin used only in few cases the word "Croatia" and mainly in respect to the increase the Serb influence in this country. As for the Croat Catholic believers in Bosnia, they were simply called "the Bosnian Catholics", who should, like the whole Bosnia, be liberated from the Austrian influence and be more inclined "to support Serbia".

It was very important to omit from Zach's plan a whole chapter, entitled "Serb-Croat relations", which stressed that Serbia, by following a constructive policy, could find in Croatia an important ally against Vienna and Istanbul. F. Zach reckoned that the good relations with the Croats were much more important than the political support of Backa and Banat, which were under Austria's administration, and moreover the Croat leaders were apt not only to cooperate for establishing the state of southern Slavs but to accept the ruling of this state by the Serb dynasty of Karadjordjeviç <sup>16</sup>.

The third important change that Zach's plan underwent by I.Garašanin was the deletion of the chapter on Serbia's internal policy. F. Zach explained that the Serb foreign policy would be unsuccessful without first arranging its internal affairs. According to him, Serbia ought to use widely the schools and vari-

ous publications of historical, geographical, ethnic and cultural character, as well as the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets, to disseminate among its citizens the spirit of cooperation until a union with the Croats be accepted without prejudice. Zach also maintained that the completion of Belgrade's Lycce library with books published in Zagre<sup>17</sup> would be to the benefit of the Serb- Croat cultural and spiritual relations and a way to make the Serbs accept the idea of equality and unity between the two countries.

The comparison of Zach's plan with Garašanin's "Naçertanije" shows that the latter omitted or changed parts of the former's plan in comformity with the narrow chauvinist interests of Serbia. Garašanin's aim has been to realize in the future the Serb hegemony over the other southern Slav countries and neigbouring non-Slav nations, such as Albania, Hungary, Roumania etc., which regions could be occupied and annexed. This has been clearly proved even by the parts that I. Garašanin has added to Zach's plan.

First of all, such insertions mainly relate to Serb-Russian relations. If F. Zach, on the one hand, did not cherish the hope of cooperating with Russia after he examined the Polish view and apparently under the influence of A. Czartoryski as well, 1. Garašanin, on the other hand, did not exclude such a possibility. According to him, Russia and Serbia, in many aspects and referring to an historical basis as well, had many premises to be allies though for the moment Petersburg had no intention to give up cooperating with Vienna for Serbia's sake<sup>18</sup>.

It is unavoidable not to see the big differences between the Yugoslavism of F. Zach and Serbism of I. Garašanin. Zach presented the fundamental principles of a Yugoslav program, according to which the union and the cultural understanding would lead to a political reconciliation. He also proposed the major preliminary measures that Serbia should take to achieve this goal. But, the Serb politicians and intelligence were inclined to accept

only the Serb chauvinist idea and not the idea of Yugoslavism, which to them, carried obscure and foreign ideals.

Despite the facts, which leave no room for doubts, the Serb pre-war historiography and that of the later periods have stressed that "Naçertanije" was a plan which aimed the union of Yugoslavia on the basis of national equality and not the Serb unitary rule <sup>19</sup>. Despite the excuses of Serb historians, each unbiased analyst can distinguish the deeply chauvinist character of Garašanin's Serb platform. In the present days, the historiography considers as undisputed the fact that Garašanin aimed to gather all the southern Slavs in an unitary state under Serbia's leadership.

Lastly, it should be stressed that Serbia's expansionist policy was based on "Naçertanije". The Serb professor, Vasa Cubrillovic, known as a chauvinist, says in his book "History of political ideas in XIX century's Serbia":

"Garašanin, by accepting the principle of

expansionism as a basis for union, the state's ruling by the Serb dynasty and the extension of Serb administration over these countries. created in 1844 the basis and the program of a Greater Serbia's political union. With these goals, the conservative political circles and elements in Serbia remained united until 1941"20. We should add that 1941 was not the deadline. This year turned out not to be the deadline neither on the following years nor the present days. The 1986 memorandum of the Serb academicians (Serb Academy of Sciences and Arts) and the concrete actions of Serb political elite in the framework of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. presently, the rump Federation, prove that, despite the adaptions of 1844 "Nacertanije" theses, its essence still constitutes the basis of the program of the present Serb politicians., who always dream about establishing a Greater Serbia at the neigbours' expense, presenting this way a factor of instability for the Balkans.

#### Notes

- 1 C. Jelavich, Garashanins Naçertanije und das grobserbiche Program."Sudost-Forschungen", XXVII(1968), Munchen, f.131-147.
- 2 "Načertanije", in "Delo", Beograd, 1906 (translating into Albanian from H.Bajrami, in *Ilia Garashanini dhe politika e tij shtetërore* 1844-1874, in "Vjetar-Godišnjak", XXIV/88, Prishtinë, 1988, pg. 127-137); D. Stranjakovic, *Kako je postalo Garašaninovo "Načertanije"*, in "Spomenik" XCI (Srpska Krajljevska Akademija), Beograd 1939, pg.65-115.
- 3 C. Jelavich, Garashanins Naçertanije und..., pg. 135.
- 4 D. Stranjakovic, Kakoje postalo ...; K. Vu...kovif, U...eshfe Hrvata u pripremi

Garašaninovog "Načertanije", in "Jugoslovenska revizija za medjunarod nom pravo", 1/3, Beograd 1954, f.44; M. Valentif, Koncepcija Garašaninova "Načertanije" (1844), in "Istorijski Pregled", VII/2, Zagreb 1961, pg.128; J. Sidak, Jugoslovenska ideja u ilirskom pokretu, in "Jugoslavenski istorijski ...asopis", II/3, Beograd, 1963, pg.31 etc.

- 5 C. Jelavich, Garashanins Naçertanije und ....., pg.133.
- 6 D.Stranjakovif, *Kakoje postalo....* pg.65-115, publishes besides "Načertanije" Zach's plan as well.
- 7 *Idem.* pg.75-79; "Vjetar-Godišjak", Prishtinë, 1988, pg.129.
  - \* Garašanin has meant the northern Alba-

nian regions, from Adriatic shores in the west to Sandjak of Nish in the East, including Kosova as well. (M.V)

8 D. Stranjaković, *Kakoje postalo....* pg.75-79; "Vjetari Godišnjak". Prishtinë 1988, f.130.

9 Idem, pg. 81-86; Idem, pg. 131-134.

10 Idem, pg.86-92; Idem, pg.134-135.

11 S.Brestovci, Marrëdhëniet shqiptaro-serbo-malazeze (1830-1878), Prishtinë, 1983; Z. Cana, Lëvizja Kombëtare Shqiptare në Kosovë, 1908-1912, Prishtinë, 1979; Z.Cana, Misioni politik i Ballgxhiqit në Shqipëri më 1913, "Përparimi".nr.1. Prishtinë,1979; Xh.Shala, Marrëdhëniet shqiptaro-serbe 1912-1928, Prishtinë,1990; B.Krizman, Elaborat doktora lvo Andrifa o Albanije, in "Časopis za Savremenu Povijest", Godina IX, Zagreb, nr.2, 1977; etc.

12 H.Bajrami, Rrethanat politikoshoqërore në Kosovë më 1918-1941, Prishtinë, 1981; A. Kodra. Pozita ekonomike-shoqërore dhe politike e kombësise shqiptare të Maqedonisë midis dy luftërave botërore, "Jehona", nr.4-5, Shkup, 1973; L.Nasi, Masat për rikolonizimine Kosovës në vitet 1945-1947. "Studime historike". Tiranë. 1981. nr.3; Z.Shtylla, Aspekte të politikës së shpërnguljes me dhunë të shqiptarëve nga Kosova në vitet 1936-1941, "Studine historike". Tiranë. 1990. nr.3; M.Verli, Reforma agrare kolonizuese në Kosovë 1918-1941, Tiranë, 1992; V.Çubrilovif, Iseljevanje arnauta (Elaborat), Beograd. 1937: Gj. Krstif, Kolonizacija na Juñnoj Srbiji. Sarajevo, 1928 etj.

13 D. Stranjaković, *Kakoje postalo...*. pg.96-97; "Vjetar-Godišnjak", Prishtinë, 1988, pg.138.

14 Idem, pg.75-89; Idem, pg.f.128-129.

15 Idem, pg. 92-95; Idem, pg. 1 34-1 37.

16 Idem, pg.92-94; Idem, pg. 136-137.

17 D. Stranjakovi f, Kako je postalo.... pg. 100-102.

18 *Idem*, pg.81; "Vjetari-Godišnjak", Prishtinë, 1988, pg. 128-133.

19 D. Stranjaković, *Kakoje postalo ...*; J. Vuckovif, *Ucešfe Hrvata u pripremi ...*. etc.

20 V.Čubrilovif, *Istorija politicke misli u Serbiji XIX veka*, Beograd, 1958, pg.175-176.

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# THE ANTI-CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLENCE AND THE SO-CALLED RULE OF LAW IN KOSOVA

n the mid 80s, the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was coming to a general economic, political and constitutional crisis. The self-administration system was dying down and the western economic aid was greatly decreasing. Consequently, the economic, social and national problems became more recurrent. The economic differences between the republics and the SFRY regions were becoming greater. The chauvinist Serb aims of taking a leading position in the Federation were being reinforced, while the other republics (and regions) were trying to keep away from those tendencies, even at the price of becoming separated from the Federation. S. Milosevic, the leader of the Communist League of Serbia (CLS) tried to put the Kosova issue at the centre of this federative crisis. He extremely exaggerated the Albanian danger and made possible the exercise of not only Serb but Yugoslav violence as well. An integral part of this violence became also the socalled rule of law with its anti-constitutional laws. In fact, "the rule of law" judicially sanctioned the Serb invasion of Kosova.

The authority of the Communist League of Yugoslavia (CLY) over the Yugoslav people was diminishing day by day. The same

was happening with the communist ideology the CLY represented. Under such circumstances, the CLS leader, S. Milosevic, with the goal of restoring the authority of his party and widening its social basis, began to play the "nationalist" card. He chose Kosova as the most appropriate place to play this game. Kosova, the autonomous region of Serbia with a 90 percent Albanian population, was affected by many economic and social problems while the national conflict had started to emerge in very severe forms since 1981. In the name of the right of self-determination and national equality with the other federal units of Yugoslav state, the Kosovar Albanians had sought to found a republic within the Yugoslav Federation.

In 1985, when S. Milosevic became CLY leader, the fierce violence, exerted for about four years against the Albanian population, as well as the cooperation between the Serb and Kosova communist leaderships held back the 1981 Albanian national movement. The Kosovar communist demands were restricted to the preservation of the 1974 constitution. But, S. Milosevic, as a representative of the CLY's extreme chauvinist wing, was interested in re-kindling the Serb-Albanian conflict and resolving it in favour of

Serbia (i.e. to stamp out the autonomy of Kosova and make it part of Serb state). For that purpose, he led an anti-Albanian organized party and state campaign. The Serb politicians deemed Serbia a victim of the 1974 constitution and of the whole post-war period. They declared that "the Serbs lost in peace what they won in war" or "the autonomous regions are two cancerous cells on the breast of the Republic of Serbia" (1) etc. The uncontrolled resentment incited a number of Serb manipulated and populist rallies, which strongly attacked Kosova's autonomy. These demonstrations took place respectively on January 23 and 28, 1989.

On January 1990, the Federation achieved what Serbia had failed to. The former-SFRY chairmanship proposed and approved the cessation of the constitutional federative Kosova's status as such a status made unsafe the domination of Serb power over the Region.

Even the representatives of the Slovene and Croat republics approved the mentioned proposal in the SFRY chairmanship. In January 1990, the distribution of forces in the SFRY chairmanship was as follows: representatives of Kosova, Vojvodina, Macedonia and Montenegro were ranked along the Serb representative and opposite to them, were the representatives of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the regions were stripped of their federative constitutional rights, it would enable the Croatian and Slovenian representatives not to be both voted and rendering the political balance over the Chairmanship quite delicate. So, Croatia and Slovenia disregarded the possible change of the subsequent political proportions between Kosova and Serbia and, based only on the momentary interests, they turned Kosova into the first victim of the SFRY new constitution. This attitude was influenced also by Croatia's objective, to divert Serbia as much as possible from its claims over the lands of the Serb population living within the Croatian state territory. But, above all, this stance was affected by the old southern Slav mentality which disagreed with the argument that the Region of Kosova is a territory with a prevailing Albanian population and that it should be equal to the other republics of the Yugoslav Federation.

Referring to the new federative draft-constitution of January 1990, the regions were deprived of the right to decide on the "crucial issues" defined by the 1974 constitution. The draft simply defined "the favouring of federative units-like republics". According to this new statute of the autonomous regions, "the regions cannot have representatives in the Yugoslav Chairmanship or judges in the constitutional Court of Yugoslavia and they cannot decide on issues by consensus but only in the framework of the delegation of the Socialist Republic of Serbia"(3).

Kosova's statute on the SFRY Constitution Draft was in full conformity with the statute of Serb draft-constitution approved by the end of June 1990 by the Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, which treated Kosova simply as a commune of Serbia with a limited "territorial cultural autonomy". According to this draft-constitution the autonomous regions had no governmental functions and their highest juridical-normative act would no longer be the "Constitution" but the "Statute", which could only come into effect with the consent of the Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Serbia.

The constitutional changes, which were happening in Yugoslavia over 1989-1990, were accompanied by a fierce violence against the Albanian population in Kosova. Quite often, terror and violence preceded very arbitrary laws and decisions, which ignored both the will of Kosova and the ruling Constitution. An unseen anti-constitutional violence accompanied also the so-called rule of law, which allegedly was established in Kosova after April 17, 1990(4) towards which a powerful propaganda was made. A

range of Serb "unique" laws supported the so-called rule of law. According to the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, the "unique" laws were issued by the Serb Parliament with the approval of not less than two thirds of the delegates of the relevant House of the Parliament of that region where the law was under discussion. But, after March 1989, the "unique" laws were not based on such criteria. They were approved only by the Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Serbia without the approval of Kosova's KSA. Although these laws were much propaganted as factors of unity, they in fact by being unitarian and by legalizing even the use of tanks, deepened the splits and quickened the dismantling of the Region's autonomy. Some of these "unique" laws were the laws on "public administration"(5), "Republican Executive Council"(6) and especially the anti- constitutional law on "special circumstances"(7) which rightly has been qualified as "a monstrous law"(8). According to this law, the Republican bodies could take by force the powers of all the state bodies, organizations and institutions of the Region.

It is a known fact that a real rule of law eliminates differences under the law, imposes respect for civil and national equality, guarantees free elections, an independent juridical system, etc. Whereas for the Albanians, the Serb "rule of law", was a police state, which was acting with vindictiveness to definitely stamp out de facto and de jure the autonomy of about 2m Albanians in Kosova without the final approval of the constitutions. Since the first days of its establishment in Kosova, the Serb "rule of law", started to eliminate regional state bodies. The Ministry of the Interior was the first to take the first blows. The Secretariat of KSA Affairs of Kosova was suspended. Within a short time (until June 4), according to an interview of the Serb Deputy-Secretary of the Interior, about 40 special police units were established in Kosova and they were controlled by Serbs, who had come from Serbia. This process was accompanied by a massive cleansing of the Albanian employees from the intelligence service and regional police bodies. About 700 of them were sacked. Others were foreseen to be dismissed (9). The economic, political, cultural and educational life in the Region came under the control of Serb police. Serb police units were installed in economic enterprises, schools, hospitals, radio-television, editors' offices and the Kosova Parliament.

During its destructive mission, the Serb "rule of law" violated the courts' autonomy. From May 1990 and on, special commissions from Serbia began to control the activity of juridical bodies while it was known that a Supreme Court already functioned in Kosova. Such an act ran contrary to the constitution of the Autonomous Socialist Region (ASR) of Kosova, according to which the communes' judges were responsible for the Parliament of their communes, whereas the judges of various regions and the Supreme Court were responsible for the Parliament of the ASR of Kosova. In mid 1990, the top officials of the Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Serbia openly expressed their aim to establish total control on the regional juridical bodies. On June 26, 1990, the Serb government passed a law that gave to Serb judicial bodies authority to suspend the relevant regional bodies (11).

If we add to these acts the repressive measures taken against Albanian employees in Kosova's economic, cultural and educational institutions; the poisoning of about 7.000 Albanians children; the maltreatment and national discrimination of Albanian students; the beatings and arrest of innocent people; the growing number of assasinations of young men; the application of programs of expulsion of Kosova Albanians(12), then it is clear to every one that a state of emergency was already established in the Region, instead of a rule of law. The Serb "rule of law"

was simply non-existing.

With the approval of the Draft on the amendments of the new constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, on June 25, 1990, the Serb legislature did not only take on the regional functions and suspended its legitimate bodies, but clearly expressed the idea of establishing a Greater Serbia which would include all the Serbs of Yugoslavia and the territories where they lived(13).

Meanwhile, Slovenia and Croatia, driven by the interest to protect their own territorial integrity as well as their political and administrative independence, expressed their favour to establish a confederacy. The inclination of Croatia and Slovenia towards a confederacy was faced with Serbia's federalist tendencies, highlighted by striking centralist features. In this way, the new constitutional processes happening in Yugoslavia clearly showed that the essence of the Yugoslav crisis was not the Kosova issue but the Serb-Croat-Slovene conflict. The Kosova issue was an integral part of this conflict and, above all, a result of the Serb expansionist policy in Kosova.

Both options, a federation and a confederacy put in danger the political, juridical and constitutional position of Kosova. According to the first alternative, introduced by Serbia and the Federation's chairmanship, Kosova no longer enjoyed federative constitutional and other state rights, guaranteed by the SFRY 1974 constitution. Kosova could not dictate its constitution and laws, could not give its consent for the Serb federative constitution, could not independently decide on economic, scientific and juridical issues etc. At the same time, Kosova had no right to be represented by political parties. Whereas according to the other alternative, Kosova was not defined as a special political-administrative entity, but as an integral part of Greater Serbia.

Under such circumstances, when one after the other, projects and decisions were

being taken to minimize and moreover to dismantle the autonomous status of Kosova, 114 Albanian delegates of Kosova Parliament approved on July 2, 1990. "The Constitutional Declaration". This historical act, which proclaimed Kosova an independent entity equal to the other federal units of the Yugoslav state(14), (federation or confederacy), is a testimony that the Albanians had a clearer vision of the new realities.

The demands for independence and equality of the Region in the Yugoslav Federation derived from massive meetings of the people in factories, institutions, communes' assemblies and villages(15). "The constitutional declaration" of July 2, 1990, was simply the materialization of these meetings. Affected by the influence and the pressure of the masses, the delegates of Kosova Parliament improved their positions and in comparison to previous years, they carried out the MP's duty without cheating the people(\*). On July 2, 1990, happened what should have taken place long ago, that which the Albanian people struggled and worked for: the approval of the constitutional declaration, which sanctioned an aspiration and a political demand, and which for many years had failed to become a reality for the Albanian population. This declaration dated back to Kosova's status over the years of the Antifascist war.

The law dictated by the Serbian-Socialist-Party-ruled Parliament, "on suspension of Kosova's Parliament and Executive Council's activities", issued on July 5, arbitrarily stopped the objective and legitimate evolution of Kosova's status. The right to self-definition and self-determination is an irrevocable right of the Kosova people, which can not and should not be denied or scraped by any of the institutions. On the basis of the 1974 SFRY constitution, the Serb Parliament had no juridical power to suspend the Kosova's KSA Assembly, which was a constitutional part of the Federation. Even the

SFRY Assembly had no such a right. Only the Kosova people, who had legitimately elected its own Parliament, had such a right. The above-mentioned law ignored even the fundamental principles of the Yugoslav Constitution referent to the equality of the Federation's states, on which basis the House of the Republics and the Regions made decisions only by consent of the republics' and regions' assemblies. On the other hand, the recognition and support of this law by the SFRY chairmanship opened the way to other invasions of Yugoslavia's federative entities. Kosova was the first victim of the Serb attack but not the last. The logic of the events leads to the conclusion that Kosova was not the last destination of Serbia.

With the law of July 5, 1990, "on suspension of Kosova's Parliament and the Executive Council activities" the anti-constitutional violence of Serb "rule of law" reached its climax. Its aim was the exclusion of the Albanian population from the constitutional talks for the federation or confederacy (i.e. talks about the future of Yugoslavia), based on the fact that they had not elected representatives to the leading bodies. After the law of July 5, no representative of the competent federative bodies went to Kosova to talk and contribute to the solution of the problems. Not even the leader of the Yugoslav state, Borislav Jovic went. He had done a tour around the federative republics and the KSA of Voivodina, in July of 1990, to discuss the changes on the future of the Yugoslav Constitution. All these facts show that the Yugoslav chairmanship considered the Kosova issue a Serbian internal affair.

On July 5, 1990, the same day that the Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Serbia issued the law on suspension of activities of Kosova's ASR government and Parliament, "extraordinary measures" were announced on Prishtina's Radio and Television, on the "Rilindja", "Zeri i Rinise" papers and in some other institutions "of vital impor-

tance" for the region(16). About 1200 Albanian members of Prishtina Radio and Television staff were fired and its programmes in Albanian language were interrupted(17). On August 7, the Serb Parliament ordered and interrupted, by violent police action, the publication of the "Rilindja" paper of Prishtina, which was Kosova's only daily paper in Albanian language. According to the news agency "Tanjug", this illegal decision was taken because the paper staff had opposed the decisions, recently announced by Serbia(18), stripping Kosova of any kind of autonomy.

With direct police intervention, the Serb "rule of law" dismantled many institutional structures of Kosova. Big economic complexes of Kosova such as "Elektrokosova", "Trepce mill", mines of Kishnica and Novoberda, brick factory in Ferizaj etc, were included by illegal means in the Serb economy, being transformed into branches of the counterpart economic institutions of Belgrade. The Kosova Bank was also closed. Its financial operations passed on to "Jugobanka" of Belgrade(19). The dismissal of thousands of Albanian workers and managers, considered "as technological waste product"(20), was the main consequence of the establishment of a violent Serb administration, which was installed in the most important economic enterprises of Kosova. Serb workers, who came from Serbia, replaced them. Their number grew day by day. The aim of these actions was to destroy the economic basis of Kosova's autonomy, place the Kosova economy under the total dependency of Serbia and increase social tensions. As a result, up to the beginning of October 1990, 70 enterprises with a total of 43.000 workers marked a considerable decrease of production rate, which dropped by 24.2 percent in comparison to the year before. The Kosova enterprises recorded an internal and external debt of 700m schillings. According to the 1990 state budget, the Federation should

have given to Kosova about 1.4bn schillings.

In reality the region was given only 55m schillings(21).

The Serbs en block attacked against the Albanian education, culture and science bodies reached the climax. The Albanian education was placed under a half-colonial position. The powers of the regional education bodies were stamped out as all of the institutions, such as the Regional Institution for Education Progress, the Institution of Texts and Teaching Materials of KASR, Council of Kosova Education etc. had no longer their previous representation. Even in this field. the unique laws suspended the teaching plans and programmes of the Region and substituted them with Serb programmes, which defined the translation of Albanian primer into Serb-Croat language! The "equality" in education was restricted in Kosova. It was done by allowing the native Albanian language in classes without national content(22). According to the Serb unique laws, the Albanian students had to learn more about the Serb and Yugoslav history and culture than about their national history and culture. On September 1990, by a special decision, a total of 1500 Serb students were registered in the first year at the Prishtina University in a time when the Belgrade University had 4.000 vacancies(23). Such an educational policy made that about 60 percent of the Albanian secondary-school students not attend institutions of higher education for "lack of places"(24). So, the Prishtina University was losing its autonomy, it was turning into a branch of Belgrade University.

In many health centres in Kosova, by unique laws or "obligatory instructions", the directors of the health institutions and the Albanian doctors were dismissed by force They were replaced by Serb doctors, who had come from Serbia(25). Whereas the so-called health commissions, which had come from Serbia "for aid" instead of assisting with medicines and medical technology, whose lack was evident in Kosova, asked for the closure of the School of Medicine and its

The supplying of the Serbs and Montenegrins with weapons(26), the inclusion of federative military units into the Serb militia police in Kosova(27), the presence of special forces of federative police (from Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Monte negro and Vojvodina)(28), the attacks on unprotected Albanian villages (such as the attack on the village of Pollate in Podujeva commune etc) aimed at paralysing the Albanian nation or to provoke it to such an extent that the Serb authorities had the chance to declare war(29). But, none of these aims was achieved.

The Kosova people did not recognize the law of July 5, 1990 of the Serb Parliament on suspension of Kosova Parliament's and government's activity on the grounds of being anti-constitutional. On September 7. 1990, in Kaçanik, the 114 Albanian delegates of Kosova Parliament unanimously approved the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova and other new laws. The Constitution that proclaimed Kosova a Republic, was drafted on the basis of the concept of making Yugoslavia a confederacy in the future. Its first article said: "The Republic of Kosova is a democratic state of the Albanian people and other states and national minorities living in Kosova". The constitution focused on the issues about the territory of the Republic of Kosova and its statal sovereignty. The constitution defined the Albanian language (and its writing) as the official language while the Serb-Croat and Turkish languages, according to the law, would be officially used in the areas where people of various national minorities lived.

The Kosova constitution documents defined that the Republic of Kosova had its own national symbols, the flag, emblem and the hymn, while the national minorities had the right to fairly use their own national symbols in accordance to the law.

The function of the collegial leader in Kosova would be carried out by the Chairmanship, made up of six members and its chairman, government and the ministries. The special resolution, announced on this occasion, revealed that "the decisions of the legitimate representatives of sovereign Kosova people have been approved in conformity with the attitudes, publicly declared by the SFRY Presidency, in the talks on Yugoslavia's future organization into republics. Since the anti-constitutional decisions and laws of the Socialist Republic of Serbia denied the right of the Kosova Albanian people to take part in talks, the only solution to their position was considered their consti tutionary in the sovereign state".

The new constitution, approved by the 114 delegates of the Kosova Parliament, was as much powerful and legal as the constitutions of other republics. Through this constitution, the Kosova Parliament gave a great contribution not only to the affirmation of equality and sovereignty of Kosova Albanian people but even to the establishment of fairer and more equal proportions within the Federation. In face of the Serb invasion, repression and provocations, the Kosova Parliament chose the way of law, Constitution and reason.

On July 2 and September 7, 1990, the Albanian people, through their numerous rallies, unanimously approved the decisions of its own Parliament. The Albanian prosecutors opposed the indictment against the Kosova Parliament's delegates, considering it "an anti-constitutional act" (30). On September 19, leaders of Kosova alternative parties (31) asked the European Parliament in Strasbourg to guarantee the protection of some Albanian delegates from Kosova Parliament, who were arrested by the Serb authorities on charges of declaring the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova (32).

The Slovene Parliament, too, approved on

September 27 a declaration "in protest to the arrest of the delegates of Kosova Regional Parliament as they had legally declared the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova" (33). The illegitimate dissolution of Kosova's KSA Parliament was disapproved even by the Croat Parliament. In one of its sessions early in October, the Parliament announced that according to the SFRY Constitution of 1974 "the powers of Kosova's KSA Parliament can not be taken on or substituted by the Serb Parliament" (34). The Serb policy in Kosova was condemned even by the Democratic League of Kosova in Ljublane, Socialist Party in Croatia, Socialist-Democratic League in Vojvodine, etc. However, the Republic of Kosova was accepted by none of the Yugoslav state bodies. Moreover, government representatives from the Yugoslav republics considered as illegitimate this new outgrowth of Kosova people.

On September 19, 1990 the Democratic Front of the Popular Socialist Republic of Albania, in one of its declarations, considered as illegitimate the dissolution of Kosova Parliament and condemned the arrest of its delegates. According to this declaration, "it is an undeniable right of the Kosova people to decide on its political future"(35). As far as "Kaçanik's Constitution" is concerned, some of the articles of the daily "Zëri I Popullit", which was the mouthpiece of the Party of Labour of Albanian Central Committee, expressed the support to the Republic of Kosova, considering it a legal outgrowth of Kosova people. However, it should be stressed that over this period the state bodies of the Popular Republic of Albania did not write articles or express support to the Republic of Kosova. The Albanian state recognized the Republic of Kosova only two years later (1992). Its national function as a maternal state left much to be desired even this time.

The policy of repression and violence of the Serb authorities in Kosova were de-

nounced even by the European Parliament. A resolution, approved on October 12, 1990 by this Parliament in Strasbourg, appealed to the Serb authorities to pull their military troops out of Kosova, release all the political prisoners arrested since 1981, stop every kind of physical violence against the Albanians, re-establish the Parliament bodies dissolved by the Serb authorities, publish the dailies and start the programmes in Albanian in radio television in order that the future elections be free and democratic, etc. At the same time, the European Parliament asked the European Community (EC) Commission to condition its attempts for the approval of the financial protocol between Yugoslavia and the European Community with the proper respect to Kosova people's human rights and the final act of Helsinki (36). It was the third time (April 13, 1989; February 15, 1990 and October 12, 1990) that the highest European parliamentary forum and the Parliament of Strasbourg, became seriously concerned about the grave situation in Kosova and approved resolutions which condemned the Serb policy and favoured the proper respect to the Albanians' rights. The democratic and progressive opinion throughout Europe and the rest of the world had long supported the fair requests of the Kosova people. This can be confirmed by the declarations of the International Helsinki Federation, American Congress, American State of Department, etc(37). But, it should also be stressed that the foreign democratic organizations or the parliaments of various European countries had expressed their support to the Kosovar human rights and not national rights.

The farther the Serb "juridical state" with its policy of violence and invasion took Kosova's autonomy away, the more the Kosovars' consciousness and the feeling of national unity was consolidated. Over April-September 1990, none of the Albanians accepted to take the posts of the dismissed directors of the economic enterprises or the cultural and scientific institutions. The local secretaries of Finance, Education, Science and Culture Departments refused to sign the minutes on their dismissal, declaring that only the Kosova Parliament could discharge them and they would apply only its laws. The Communist League of Yugoslavia and other political-legal organizations were abandoned. Political organizations, called "Kosova's alternatives" were established. They constituted the cores of the future political parties, which aimed the protection of Albanian people's legal and democratic rights(38); the first campaign of bloodfeud reconciliation was organized and the old revenges were left behind. The populations of Prishtina, Prizren, Gjakova, etc. sheltered the students of Prishtina University and other higher colleges expelled from the dormitories with the only aim to keep open the centres of knowledge, culture and regeneration of nation's strength and vigour. All the population strata used to see their future closely related the future of the Region and its political and constitutional statute. All these facts confirm that the Albanians, with their dignified, peaceful and patriotic attitude, were day by day arousing Europe's interest and sympathy.

#### Notes:

- 1 "Rilindja", 2-27 shtator 1988.
- 2 Teksti i propozimit të Kryesisë së RSFJ-

Albanians only in the framework of their

së për ndryshimin e kushtetutës në fuqi dhe nxjerrjen e kushtetutës së re, Prishtinë, janar 1990.

- 3 Idem.
- 4 On April, 17, 1990, the state of emergency,

established by the Federation, was lifted in Kosova. The Socialist Republic of Serbia promised to restore peace and public order in Kosova through the Serb rule of law.

- 5 TANJUG, Beograd, 27 qershor 1990.
- 6 Idem.
- 7 Idem.
- 8 "Slobodna Dalmacija", gusht 1990.
- 9 TANJUG, Beograd, 4 gershor 1990
- 10 "Rilindja", 13 maj 1990, f.2; 1 qershor 1990, f.5
  - 11TANJUG, 15 gershor 1990.

12 It is about a Serb programme "on peace, freedom, equality, democracy and prosperity of Kosova", which defined the settling of about 100,000 Serbs and Montenegrins in the Region. This was realized when the density of Kosova population was twice higher than Yugoslavia's and thrice than Serbia's, when the number of jobless people, according to official statistics, recorded to 145.000 (in fact, the figure is larger), 80 percent of whom were young people and when the inter-ethnic relations were quite tense. The Serb colonisation of the Region was supported even by the "Yugoslav program on Kosova", which defined by law the construction of 2.000 houses and the distribution of 700 pieces of land free of charge to the colonists. So far, the industrial and health centres, defined by the program, have been built only in the Serb and Montenegrin-inhabited communes, such as Zubin, Patok, Lipjan and Fushë-Kosovë. Whereas the police buildings were the only objects, constructed in accordance to the program, in the Albanians-inhabited communes, such as in Malishevë. ("Rilindja", 8 Maj 1990, f.16; 9 mai 1990, f.16; 12 mai 1990, f.10). "Rilindja", 26 qershor 1990, f.6.

- 14 Idem, 3 korrik 1990, f.1-2.
- 15 Idem, 1 maj 2 korrik 1990.
- \* Idem, 1 maj 2 korrik 1990. The evolution of the attitudes of Kosova deputies came rapidly. On June 20, 1990, when the meeting

of Kosova Parliament was interrupted, 62 delegates signed the amendments on taking the decision to start procedures on Kosova Constitution's approval. 12 other delegates signed it the next day. On July 2, 1990 the number of delegates that signed became 114.

- 16 Idem, 8 korrik 1990, f.1
- 17 Idem, 31 korrik 1990, f.15.
- 18 TANJUG, Prishtinë, 8 gusht 1990.
- 19 Idem, Beograd, 29 shtator 1990.
- 20 On September, 1990, the Kosova's Independent Trade Unions declared in a press conference that more than 28.000 workers of Albanian nationality have been dismissed according to the declaration of the "political measures".
  - 21 APA, Beograd, 11 tetor 1990.
  - 22 "Rilindja", 15 maj 1990.
- 23 Idem, 11 korrik 1990, f.7-8; 24 korrik 1990, f.7.
  - 24 Idem, 13 korrik 1990, f.7-8
  - 25 Idem, 8 korrik 1990, f.8-9
  - 26 Idem, 5 gusht 1990, f.3.
  - 27 TANJUG, Prishtinë, 18 gusht 1990
  - 28 Idem.
  - 29 "Vjesnik", 9 gusht 1990.
  - 30 TANJUG, Prishtinë, 19 shtator 1990.
- 31 **The alternative Kosova parties** are political parties, which are in opposition with the Serb power but they are still unregistered as the Kosova Parliament had not yet issued the law on political parties' registration.
  - 32 TANJUG, Prishtinë, 20 shtator 1990.
  - 33 Idem, Ljublanë, 28 shtator 1990.
  - 34 Idem, Zagreb, 5 tetor 1990.
  - 35 "Zëri i Popullit", 19 shtator 1990.
  - 36 ATSH, Strasburg, 12 tetor 1990.
- 37 "Zëri i Popullit", 8 shtator 1990; ATSH, Uashington, 7 shtator 1990; "Zëri i Popullit", 11 tetor 1990.
- 38 Until September 1990, only the Democratic League of Kosova estimated more than 700,000 members.

### A DOCUMENT THAT PROVES GENOCIDE

The letter of Melihate Deda to the Yugoslav Communist Party Committee on Kosova (December 1944)

here are many documents, released from the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP) during the Second World War, which prove in a more flexible way the anti-Albanian and genocidal platform of the YCP leadership, especially of the military members and the leader of the Yugoslav National-Liberation Army (YNLA) as well as the Yugoslav Partisan Units (YPU) against the Kosovar Albanians and their ethnic regions. Under such a category falls the following document, which is a report of Melihate Deda, an activist of the YCP Regional Committee on Kosova and Rrafsh i Dukagjinit as well as Secretary of the YCP Regional Committee in Peja. The letter was submitted as a report to the YCP Regional Committee in Kosova.

The original of this document is kept in the State Archives of Kosova (F.OKKM, K.10/29, no:1305) in Prishtina. The four-page document is written with pen in Serb language and in Cyrillic alphabet. The report is signed by MIMI, which is the nickname for Melihate Deda.

By the end of 1944 (November-December), Melihate Deda, the wife of Rashit Deda from Mitrovica (Rashiti was one of the distinguished activists of the Anti-Fascist Liberation Movement of Kosova and member of the Peja Local YCP Committee, who heroically fell at the place called Kala e Dodës together with the People's

Hero, Hajdar Dushi, on September 22, 1944), was sent by the party in Malësia e Kaçanikut. Shocked and very much concerned about the plundering, maltreatment, crimes and terror that the YNLA partisan units were exerting on hte Albanians, she decides to make a report through which she informed the YCP Regional Committee on Kosova and Rrafsh i Dukagjinit about these crimes. On this report, she asked for the ending of these anti-Albanian acts and the taking of adequate measures against the criminals.

Such documents (which are not few in number) show and prove that the Yugoslav party and military leadership during the WWII had as a major objective the extermination of the Albanians and the ethnic cleansing of their regions. In essence, such aims were identical to the projects of the Cetnic Movement of Drazha Mihailovic on Albanians'annihilation. So, the orientations and the aims were the same and only the way presentation and realization differed. Contrary to the Cetnic Movement leadership which made its plans public, openly declaring their purpose to carry out genocide against the Albanians, the YCP and the YNLA high leaderships kept them secret by announcing only an internationalist platform. Since they exercised their power through their executive military forces, they always made them a reality in the name of war against the Albanian "anti-revolutionary", "reactionary" and nationalist forces.

The result of these anti-Albanian and inhuman plans was the killing without trials of approximately 50.000 Albanians from Kosova and other Albanian ethnic regions, by the end of 1944 and start of 1945.

Following is the full text of the document:

#### Dear comrades

Recently, I have had closer contacts with the army and some military chiefs. At the beginning, when I was in Manastir i Devotshëm (Karadaku i Shkupit), I noted chauvinistic feelings not only in the army but in its leadership as well. Later on, after the liberation of Skopje, when I came to Kaçanik, I was in close contact with comrades of the Division Staff (I assume it was the Division 42), composed of the Brigades 16, 18, 12 and 17. Some friends, most of which, members from the Division Staff, have wrong outlooks on their attitudes towards the Albanian masses and soon I saw that chauvinism, which threatened with all its force to hit the innocent masses, could not be refrained.

If, at the start, I thought that our army demonstrated chauvinistic feelings only because it fought against the Albanians, later I came to the conclusion that the problem was about the facts concerning the infiltration of hostile elements into the National-Liberation Army. They, under the flag of our army, were living a life of luxury, and with their destructive activity, they carried on to sully the name of our National-Liberation Army. My comrades, now my suspicion is no longer based on impressions. It is my obligation to present all the arguments in order to make a routine inquest and deservedly punish all those who in a way tried to thwart the war.

When our Party, in its rallies, spoke about the National-Liberation Movement's objectives for this area, the people openly said that the reality was quite different. I have drawn the conclusion that our Army, instead of offering contribution, caused more harm since our main weapon in fighting various reactionary and profoundly hostile elements, was taken away. We have not been able to prove by examples to people that the propaganda of the enemy, invaders and their servants, aimed to incite a civil war, which was only to the benefit of our people's betrayers.

I will briefly relate some facts happening in Kacanik.

The 12th Brigade has imprisoned innocents and beaten up little children only to divulge information about arms caches. Ten-year-old children also have been incarcerated on suspicion of "having relations with the bandits".

Villagers have been hit for providing food, beans and potatoes to our army. The bleeding villagers said even that the Council (it was meant for the National-Liberation Councils) is cheating and that the army's attitude is hostile almost everywhere etc.

I should stress that when the political commissar asked the commander to give explanations about such maltreatments, the former took as a response: "We have been ordered to kill 50 percent of the Albanians".

When I came into contact with the army, I learned many horrendous facts for which I think it is not wrong to comment on the way these investigations should be conducted.

1) The political delegation of the 2nd Platoon, 2nd Fighting Unit and First Battalion of XII Brigade - Radulle Ragjenoviq, reveals much

He said that the commander himself has killed people whenever he liked to. In the village of Bellanoc, the villagers welcomed the soldiers and served them apples but the soldiers were given the order, which was later carried out, to shoot them somewhere far from the village. Whereas in the village of Izvor, the army forces have hit the villagers and plundered their houses. Although women and children screamed out with fear, the soldiers went house to house and took the pretty girls. "We do not dare to react for fear of throwing ourselves on mercy or cruelty," - a young man said.

Georgi Sazdan, the political commissar of the 2nd Fighting Unit of Battalion I said that the official position of the leadership theoretically was against the immoral acts and injustices. However, they are the ones who carry out those actions. In a hospital, one of our friends struggled throughout the night to survive over the violence-caused wounds.

It has often happened, Radulle Radoneviq said, that the villagers together with their wives and children have left the village out of fear. In such cases, the order was given to confiscate their cattle. However, the villagers, considering such punishing actions, do not dare to welcome the partisans.

Brigade XII also used to take herds of cows and sheep with itself. Some said that they were the trophies of war while for others "They were taken away from the criminals". They took cattle even in the village of Drenogllavë.

In a meeting in Shtërpcë, the women were really shocked at how bad it was spoken about the partisans and how the army really plundered the villages.

I think there is no justification for that. "Various elements have penetrated into our army, which has now become larger. That's why it is no wonder that such things can happen...".

MIMI

At the end of this material, it should be said that by reading this document carefully, one can not avoid asking the following question: "Have the Serb military, police and pre-military forces bidden even to date to kill all the Albanians in Kosova?" The document sounds even at present quite topical since the Serb power, governed by its leader Milosevic, has not yet given up its anti-Albanian projects. Moreover, what they failed to realize before, during or after the Second World War, they are trying to achieve now through the undeclared war against the Albanian people of Kosova by launching and carrying out the genocide-related projects from "Naçertanije" (1844) and the Memorandum of Serb Academy of Sciences (1986) to the latest projects which are being applied to annihilate the Albanian population especially in Drenica, Deçan, Gjakova, Klinë and other regions in Kosova.

While the Serb army is executing an unprecedented genocide by killing children, pregnant women, young and elderly men all over Kosova; burning villages and cities without any reason, bombarding Albanians' schools and houses, relaunching its early and new plans for the extermination and the ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population in Kosova, every attentive reader, Albanian or normal people can not help asking where the conscience of mankind and especially of the international institutions/ UN, NATO, OSCE etc./ lay, why are they allowing the Serb aggressor to act freely in accomplishment of its macabre objectives. Likewise, the interest and the obligation of the Albanian state towards the ethnic regions should be greater in these dramatic moments. Such an indifference will probably have unrepairable consequences for the future of the people of the troubled Balkans, a region which has long been considered as a powder keg.

## GEORGE KASTRIOTE - SKANDERBEG

he national hero of the Albanians, George Kastriote -Skanderbeg (1405-17.01.1468) personifies a whole historical epoch, which was identified with his name: the one-century war against the Ottoman invasion (end of XIV C end of XV C). Under his leadership (1443-1468), the Albanians' war reached a higher stage and became better -organized. It also marked a turning-point in the political development of Albania.

George Kastriote - Skanderbeg was the most consistent and notable representative of the Albanian ruling elite, who led with much determination the Albanians' war against the Ottoman aggressors. He realized the first political alliance of the Albanians, the Albanian League of Lezha, which prepared the ground for the establishment of the independent Albanian state whose founder was Skanderbeg himself.

The Albanians'legendary epoch, under the leadership of George Kastriote-Skanderbeg, represents one of the most important events in the national history of the Albanians. It helped much in defending for many decades the freedom of some of the Albanian regions and also encouraged the inhabitants of the still occupied areas to keep on fighting with determination against the Ottoman rule.

The XV C epoch had a tremendous effect on the Albanians' national consciousness. It be-

came a symbol of the country's pride in its glorious past as well as an inexhaustable source of inspiration for the unification of all the Albanians in their fight for freedom and an independent nation-state.

The Albanians' war against the Ottoman power was of great importance even from the international perspective. As the armies of the Ottoman Empire, which was at the peak of its power, occupied Albania for tens of years, the Albanians' fight created a solid barrier, which prevented the influx of Ottoman invaders into Italy, defending this way the freedom of the Western European countries and their all-sided development.

This war brought Albania into the international arena and strengthened so much its links with other European countries that the latter came to ask for its military support to resolve their internal affairs. Between 1460-1461. Skanderbeg was to go on a military expedition to Italy in support of the King of Naples. Ferdinand.

The anti-Ottoman resistance of the Albanians, under the leadership of George Kastriote-Skanderbeg, was highly appreciated by the European opinion and the personalities of the following centuries, who considered it an example of the fight for freedom. This fact is also proved by the many scientific and artistic works, pub-

lished in various languages and by different countries, that are dedicated to Skanderbeg and his fight, as well as by the monuments of the Albanian hero erected in many European squares.

The following documents reveal to a cer-

tain extent the personality of the National Hero of the Albanians and the assessment of some of the most distinguished political personalities of his time towards this figure, and his immortal work.



VULA E GJON KASTRIOTIT SIPAS DOK. 793 E SMADHUEME 1:10

Congratulation letter of Ragusa Senate (1452) to Skanderbeg about his victories against Ottoman armies

Your Majesty and Mighty brother and our much beloved friend. We have no words to praise and revere the incredible magnificence of your soul, your unmatched wisdom and valour, which you displayed for the protection of the Catholic religion from the cruel Turks as enemies of the Christian name. Who is the one who does not think that you are worthy of such a value, and that you have achieved the glory of the happiness that each man with a lofty soul wishes to bestow on you? Although few in number, you resisted an innumerable army and protected the city and its regions from the fury and weight of a such well-organized army. For that, Almighty God will reward you with an everlasting prize while the kings and princes of the whole world will shower you with eternal happiness and glory. So, as you have done so far, continue the fight for the true religion, disseminate the name of the Christians and your glory in order that none can add to your blessing. Let yourself be a mirror and an example to all the princes and the nations. Let your name consecrate an eternal fame.

We can do nothing else but congratulate you on your glorious contribution to the honour and glorification of Christianity, the old and inherited friendship and the kindness that you, like your predecessors, have always had from us.

-2-

### Letter from Pope Calixtus III addressed on February 6, 1458, to Skanderbeg

.... We broke the news about the havoc that the cruel Turks have wreaked on your lands and regions; we have also been told about the peculiar majesty of your soul towards the fight against them, as is proper for a Catholic prince, in order to break down their fury, and the continuous attempts you are making towards that goal. I worship God's honour for bringing you to those regions where the perfidious and cruel enemy could have found a path to attack Christianity, since being an effective shield against this foe which you often have been obliged to face in the war, destroying him so many times with your splendour and loftier glory. Oh, if only other Christian princes were as brave as you! Then, we would not be so worried and compassionate about our religion's protection. So, my dear son, be resolute in your conviction, and in your sacred and sound purpose!

-3-

Skanderbeg's reply, sent on October 31, 1460, to the Prince of Tarent, Johanes

Antonius de Ursinis. Its content and style prove the humanistic cultural background of the Albanian National Hero.

Your very serene Prince and Honourable Sir I read the letter from You Sir, which surprised rather than upset me after I saw what you had written. First, you state that, when you were informed that we had said to his serene Majesty, King Ferrant, that if he could provide us with ships, we would load them with soldiers who would set Brindisi ablaze and destroy the country, you could not believe that because of thinking me a mild and discreet man, until our soldiers proved that in Puglia. Our response to this question is as follows: it is true that when we were told that you had risen against His Majesty, we asked him to send us ships to transport soldiers, infantrymen and horsemen there in his help. If he would have done that and engaged us, we would have not set Brindisi on fire while the Puglia districts, which rose up in revolt, would have not mutinied. In this case, it would have been difficult for you to defend your power, let alone think of grabbing the power of His Majesty, who is your leader and as such you should consider him because you have taken an oath.... If you regard us as faithful, meek and circumspect, you should not be surprised by that as you should know that due to the advice, honours and sacred deeds of this heavenly King, we managed to protect ourselves from the suppression and the cruel claws of the Turks, as enemies of ourselves and the Catholic faith. If conquered, Italy would have felt that, and consequently the country you claimed to be yours would have passed to the Turks' rule! After this great good we received from His Majesty, Alphonso, my vassals and I could not break faith with his son, Ferdinand, without humbling ourselves and becoming covered with the shame of dishonesty and ingratitude. So, after studying carefully and prudently this problem, we can say that for that we have sought to keep faith in protection of what we have gone through, with the many dangers and faced so many times with death.... In your letter, you say that I should not think that I could help King Ferrant as all the barons and members of the kingdom have revolted against him. My response to that is as follows: If because of that reason. King Ferdinand is now in a difficult position, the fault and the shame of ignominy, and all manner of other bad things would lay on you as you have been the leader. You have behaved like immoral women, who when they begin to grow old, try by flatter, to goad others into doing what they have done before; you too have killed many barons and members of the kingdom! However, we do not think that because of this King Ferdinand has lost, because God will protect his justice; the support of his friends and kin will not be lacking. But, remember that the Sultan's power was greater than yours, and those who advocate you, and when only the city of Kruja was left to me, and finding myself encircled, I protected it from that power until the Turks retreated, damaged and in shame. Within a short time and with a few troops. I re-took control of that which numerous enemies have won over a long time. So, this is another reason to hope much more in the rehabilitation of King Ferrant's power, who if having only Naples, will score victory and for that you must be sure.

Concerning what you say that I, along with the Albanians, cannot help or defend him or conquer his powerful enemies, I can say that you are wrong. If our chronicles do not deceive us, we are called Epirotes and you should know that in the past, our predecessors entered your country and fought great battles with the Romans and we know that in most cases we honoured and not shamed ourselves. I will do my best, using all my efforts and potential, and the support of my friends and faithful people, to help and give a hand to King Ferdinand, and if I can't carry out my duty as honour demands, at least I will do what I have to do. But, you incite me to withdraw my soldiers and also say to me that if I want to fight, here are the Turks with whom I can score a greater glory and honour. My response to that is: I do not want inducement or advice from you; we have not sent out our soldiers to return so soon but to serve King Ferrant until his kingdom is united. And they are such people who, if necessary, would voluntarily face death in service of His Majesty. But, those we have sent are nothing in comparison to the ones we intend to dispatch. If His Majesty agrees to and if it would be necessary, I will come in person with so many troops that it would be enough, with God's help, not only to take control of Puglia but also to inhabit it, because now it is depopulated. We cannot deny the close contacts with the Turks as you say because we have often fought side by side with them with much glory and honour as every one knows. But now, after you gave us the excuse, we have declared a truce for a three-year period in order to satisfy the desires of King Ferdinand. But, such a recommendation of yours would have been of a greater dignity and much more useful for your soul and body if you were to have directed it to yourself because since you are an elderly person and in closer contact with the Turks than any other Italian gentleman, you could have not consummated your days and money too on a more glorious undertaking, encouraged by God and some of the countries that you have recently incited against yourself.

So, I advise you: take this decision and I would be willing and zealous and let alone this Kingdom and its leader towards which neither I nor you can deny our obligations etc.

Released on last day of October [1460]. George Kastriote, called Skanderbeg

-4-

Thank-you letter (26 October 1461) of Duke of Milan, Francesk Sforca to Skander beg for his valuable military contribution to the triumph of the King of Naples Ferdinand

... It would have been more becoming as well as our duty at the same time if we had written to you, before you, Sir, wrote to us, and con-

tion Front attitudes towards the Kosova issue could not be made beyond the afore-said historic reality and the alliances forged during the WWII to face the Italian fascist and German aggressors. There is no doubt that the creation of the world anti-fascist alliance, embraced by countries, people and nations which had already fallen victim of the fascist aggression or risked to, was a great historic event for the future of humanity.

This alliance found the Albanian people and the Albanian National-Liberation Movement already involved in the anti-fascist war and consequently with the moral right to take the deserved place among the democratic and antifascist forces. Within the framework of this alliance and its general orientation, the line and the objectives of the National-Liberation War were defined. On their basis, actions were taken to resolve the numerous sensitive problems that concerned the Albanian society, of course according to their order and importance, the freedom and the independence of the country on the first place in order to open way to the solution of other problems, inherited from history, such as the delicate issue of Kosova.

On such a basis, the Kosova platform was a hope and a possibility for the solution of this vital problem to the Albanians, but only if the Great Powers' support and the good understanding with the neighbouring Yugoslavia, with which Albania had created a close political and military alliance, would be assured.

The ideas on the solution of Kosova issue are not found in a sole document. They are elaborated and reflected in the acts, approved by the most important meetings during the war, and in the National-Liberation Movement's press. By respecting rigorously the obligations that derived from the anti-fascist alliance and the recommendations of the Comintern on borders, the Communist Party, as the leading force of the war and the National-Liberation Front, evaded an open declaration on Kosova issue. Consequently, such declarations have not been found neither in the program, approved by the Foundation Meeting of November 8, 1941, nor

in the decisions of some of its important meetings including the Extraordinary Conference, on June 1942 or the Conference I on March 1943 etc.

Although concerned for not opening earlier the debates on the delicate issue of Kosova, the Albanian Communist Party (ACP) finally was obliged to express its views for its solution as this issue was vital to Albanian people, moreover in the circumstances when most of the Albanian regions had reunited with Albania. For that reason, this question should not only be avoided for much time and so much the less ignore it. Moreover, this issue should be carefully treated in order that the attitudes be clear enough and devoid of misunderstanding, as well as in conformity with the feelings, will and the legal aspirations of Kosova and Albanian people in general, despite the reaction they might cause to Yugoslavia and other big allies.

For the first time, the ACP stance towards the Kosova issue was expressed in the Peza Conference, where representatives of various nationalist factions took part. The conference agreed to the principle that the Kosova issue should be resolved in the wake of the war in accordance to the principle of self-determination as the Charter of Atlantic prescribed. Meantime, the Albanian National-Liberation General Council would offer the proper boost to the Kosova people in order to get them organized against the invaders and legalize consequently the right for self-determination<sup>4</sup>.

The ACP also declared its stance to Kosova in an article of "Zëri I Popullit" right after the Peza Conference, on occasion of the first publication of "Zëri I Popullit" of Kosova. The article cited: "The voice of Kosova and Metohia (Rrafsh I Dukagjinit) people is a lively tribune of the National-Liberation Movement in Kosmet, of that movement which today organizes the people against the invaders and tomorrow would lead the people towards independence and freedom and give full rights to the people of Kosova and Metohia to self-decide on its fate<sup>5</sup>.

Whereas in Mukje, the meeting between the

National-Liberation Front and the National Front organization, held on August 1943, agreed on the ACP opinion that the Kosova issue would be resolved after the war on the basis of the self-determination principle as the Atlantic Charter defined<sup>6</sup>.

Since the reached agreement was denounced in this meeting by the ACP leadership, the latter was obliged to explain once again its attitude towards Kosova in the Second National-Liberation Conference, which was held one month later, on September 1943.

Among other things, the report of this conference cites as follows: "The issues of Kosova and Cameria will be resolved in conformity with the Atlantic Charter and the principle of nations' self-determination. The biggest guarantee for the triumph of this principle is the war that Kosova and Cameria have done and will do side by side with the Yugoslav and Greek people to destroy the Italian and German fascism and along with it all the imperialistic and chauvinistic tendencies throughout the world and especially in the Balkans.

On the reverse, the Kosova people would fight against that Yugoslavia which would enslave it"

On December 1943, the ACP launched a tract to the Kosova people, which among others cited: "The only way of salvation and fulfilment of your desires is the fight against the invaders side by side with the Yugoslav people, the National-Liberation War which would secure the right of self-determination up to secession".

This public declaration was made while the ACP leadership was not yet concretely and clearly expressed on the future of Kosova and such a stand had caused much concern and disappointment among the popular masses. The fascist invasion and its reactionary forces, in Kosova and Albania, were trying to take advantage of such a situation for separating the people from the National-Liberation Movement. Under such circumstances, especially after the German invasion, difficult times came for the National-Liberation Movement in Kosova. The

German Nazi, hailing themselves as liberators and friends of Albanian people, took a number of demagogic measures. They established the so-called new Albanian administration and appointed a number of Kosova personalities in its bodies. Concretely, the interim Executive Committee, established on September 1943 in Tirana, had six members, two of which, Bedri Pejani and Xhaferr Deva, were from Kosova. Of 243 members of the National Assembly, assembled on October, 150 were from Kosova, while Rexhep Mitrovica from Kosova was appointed leader of the "Albanian government", established in November by the invaders. On September 1943, the "Prizren's League" was founded in Prizren and it enjoyed the support of Hitlerian Germany. In such circumstances, the National-Liberation Movement in Kosova was not having the expected progress. Moreover, a part of population cherished illusions for the "pro-Albanian" policy of the Germans and the program of Ethnic Albania, which was elaborated by the Second League of Prizren. The ACP tract, launched under such circumstances, aimed to explain its policy towards Kosova and on this basis increased the confidence and the support of Kosova people for the National-Liberation Movement.

Finally, the stand of the Albanian National-Liberation Movement towards the Kosova issue would be clearly unveiled in the Congress of Permet, which was held on May 1944. The opening speech of this Congress, held by the Head of the Albanian National-Liberation Antifascist Council, Omar Nishani, stressed that: "If the Kosovars want to win the right on self-determination on the basis of Atlantic Charter..... they should be integrated into the National-Liberation Front and fight the German Nazism. Only by following this path, Kosova, after the war, would have the right to decide on its fate until it secedes"."

But, as in some important meetings of the National-Liberation Movement, held during the years of war, an open attitude was maintained towards Kosova, in communication with the masses, National-Liberation Front structures,

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